If existential commitment and foundationalism both boil down to 'I believe this because I believe it' - which it seems to me that they do - then how does creating a dialectic between Reason and Ethics break the circle?
Merely to claim Ethical Position A because of Non-Ethical Position B and Non-Ethical Position B because of Ethical Position A would indeed make a circle, although its viciousness or virtuousness might be in question. But there's no reason we can't say--and this is one of the main thoughts up my sleeve, but we're definitely far outside the things which I am (based on that short-term existential commitment I alluded to above) certain of--A1 because of B1 because of A2 because of B2 because of A3 because of. . .
While I like the Ouroboors imagery of Reason and Ethics devouring themselves, I suppose it's less of a circle and more of a spiral--and ultimately, I suppose, a form of infinitism. Or maybe it is a circle, just with infinite graduations. The key thing is that an absolutely necessary characteristic of circularity is maintained--that meta-statements about the system as a whole can be justified using the elements of the system. To take theology as my example, if we take a New Criticism lens to Scripture and it tells use to interrogate Scripture using a New Criticism lens, that's all well and good and not particularly exciting. But if it tells us to use a New Historicist lens, and then the New Historicist lens tells us to use a post-colonial one. . . .
Even if we're skeptical of the usefulness of infinitism as a justificatory practice, I don't think the burden of proof is necessarily on the one who holds the ethical position at this point, though. These are the issues which underly all cognition, and would inflict any contrary position, including positivism, equally.
You've lost me round that bend. Where does scripture come into it?
Well, I'm assuming that looking at Scripture is part of what the discipline of theology (which I'm lumping with metaphysics and epistemology and philosophy of language and Goddess knows how many other disciplines into the catch-all "Reason") would do. If that ethics isn't logically prior to theology, then at least some part of our ethics will end up derived from Scripture. *eyes shellfish warily*
In my understanding, even if one is claiming that a notion is innate then empirical observation is required to discover it and prove its innateness.
Hmm. I'm wondering what, exactly, counts as empirical observation. Specifically, does phenomenology? If I say, "Hmm, I can't conceive of a square circle. Can you?" and you tell me that you can't either, does that constitute empirical observation? Is cogito, ergo sum an observation?
One of the sources of my faith (that is to say, my religious faith) is recognizing that two of the greatest atheistic philosophers of the last century, Ludwig Wittgenstein and Jacques Derrida, coming from the separate and dueling Western philosophical traditions of that age, couldn't exorcise a type of mystic transcendentalism from their work no matter how hard they tried. Is that recognition an empirical observation?
Which looks very much like an observation.
When I wrote that the limits of previous paradigms reveal themselves in history I was mostly trying to be poetic and feeling a bit Hegelian (I haven't read any Hegel, though, so take that which a grain of salt). That said, I can't think of anything wrong with the statement, so I suppose I stand behind it, at least tentatively. Not sure it's falsifiable, though. . . .
no subject
Merely to claim Ethical Position A because of Non-Ethical Position B and Non-Ethical Position B because of Ethical Position A would indeed make a circle, although its viciousness or virtuousness might be in question. But there's no reason we can't say--and this is one of the main thoughts up my sleeve, but we're definitely far outside the things which I am (based on that short-term existential commitment I alluded to above) certain of--A1 because of B1 because of A2 because of B2 because of A3 because of. . .
While I like the Ouroboors imagery of Reason and Ethics devouring themselves, I suppose it's less of a circle and more of a spiral--and ultimately, I suppose, a form of infinitism. Or maybe it is a circle, just with infinite graduations. The key thing is that an absolutely necessary characteristic of circularity is maintained--that meta-statements about the system as a whole can be justified using the elements of the system. To take theology as my example, if we take a New Criticism lens to Scripture and it tells use to interrogate Scripture using a New Criticism lens, that's all well and good and not particularly exciting. But if it tells us to use a New Historicist lens, and then the New Historicist lens tells us to use a post-colonial one. . . .
Even if we're skeptical of the usefulness of infinitism as a justificatory practice, I don't think the burden of proof is necessarily on the one who holds the ethical position at this point, though. These are the issues which underly all cognition, and would inflict any contrary position, including positivism, equally.
You've lost me round that bend. Where does scripture come into it?
Well, I'm assuming that looking at Scripture is part of what the discipline of theology (which I'm lumping with metaphysics and epistemology and philosophy of language and Goddess knows how many other disciplines into the catch-all "Reason") would do. If that ethics isn't logically prior to theology, then at least some part of our ethics will end up derived from Scripture. *eyes shellfish warily*
In my understanding, even if one is claiming that a notion is innate then empirical observation is required to discover it and prove its innateness.
Hmm. I'm wondering what, exactly, counts as empirical observation. Specifically, does phenomenology? If I say, "Hmm, I can't conceive of a square circle. Can you?" and you tell me that you can't either, does that constitute empirical observation? Is cogito, ergo sum an observation?
One of the sources of my faith (that is to say, my religious faith) is recognizing that two of the greatest atheistic philosophers of the last century, Ludwig Wittgenstein and Jacques Derrida, coming from the separate and dueling Western philosophical traditions of that age, couldn't exorcise a type of mystic transcendentalism from their work no matter how hard they tried. Is that recognition an empirical observation?
Which looks very much like an observation.
When I wrote that the limits of previous paradigms reveal themselves in history I was mostly trying to be poetic and feeling a bit Hegelian (I haven't read any Hegel, though, so take that which a grain of salt). That said, I can't think of anything wrong with the statement, so I suppose I stand behind it, at least tentatively. Not sure it's falsifiable, though. . . .