The Meta/Ethics of Radical Feminism, Not by Mary Daly

[alixtii]

In the comments of hannahrorlove's post attacking slash goggles, peasant_ and I somehow found ourselves in a conversation about the metaethics of radical feminism. Specifically, she asked:

If you reject relativism as uncomfortable, and you reject an exploration of belief formation as uninteresting, what has led you to believe in the near-universal radical nature of the problem?

It's true to say that I'm a radical feminist (insofar as I am one), as a result of certain important influences in my youth and childhood, in particular the influence of my mother, one of my high school English teachers, etc. (Mostly my mother.) This is true, but uninteresting. As a philosophically-interested human being, I don't just hold certain beliefs but also justify them to myself. These justifications are, of course, also causally determined and could be, if one were interested in doing so, explained in purely material terms. But I can't think of myself merely as a belief box (anybody have a cite for this concept?) into which random beliefs were merely shoved by nature, and I don't really think anybody could.

Mary Daly, in her book Gyn/Ecology, which is actually subtitled The Metaethics of Radical Feminism (and how disturbing is it that my copy--which is really my mother's old copy, has a huge picture of an axe on the cover?), which has been the deepest and most direct radical feminist influence on me in my adolescence and throughout my life, seems to avoid the question somewhat:

I would say that radical feminist metaethics is of a deeper intuitive type than "ethics." The latter, generally written from one of several (but basically the same) patriarchal perspectives, works out of hidden agendas concealed in the texture of language, buried in mythic reversals which control "logic" most powerfullly because unacknowledged.

[. . .]

There are, of course, male-authored, male-identified works which purport to deal with "metaethics." In relation to these, gynography is meta-metaethical. For while male metaethics claims to be "the study of ethical theories, as distinguished from the study of moral and ethical conduct itself," [she cites Titus and Keaton's Ethics for Today here as the source of the quote] it remains essentially male-authored and male-identified theory about theory. Moreover, it is only theory about "ethical theories"--an enterprise which promises boundless boringness. In contrast to this, Gyn/Ecology is hardly "metaethical" in the sense of masturbatory meditations by ethicists upon their own emissions. Rather, we recognize that the essential omissions if these emissions is of our own life/freedom. In the name of our life/freedom, feminist metaethics O-mits seminal omissions. (12-13)

There is much to love in these passages (remind me to re-read the entire book over the summer). But this still leaves open the question: where do radical feminist ethics come from? (Daly's next paragraph implies the answer might be the goddess Metis.)

A certain amount of philosophical pragmatism, a la Richard Rorty, enters into the discussion for me at this point. I think I've indicated before that I'm not sure what it would mean to assert that "the nature of the problem is radical and near universal" as some type of meaningful, propositional claim. How would one go about falsifying such a claim?

What I would argue is that the claim does not and cannot have a truth value. Instead, it is useful to conceive of the problem as being radical and near universal, while making no ontological claim--because pragmatism in general eschews ontology.

The questions raised by this answer are obvious: useful to whom? and according to what standard of usefulness? I don't see anything obviously wrong in ethicizing epistemology and metaphysics (well, I could see someone arguing it was contradictory to the self-evident nature of truth, but that's rather begging the question) (and theology goes here as well; this was an important point as I working on feminist meta/theology in undergrad), but certainly we need to have some account of feminist ethics in place?

I can see three possible responses (and this part of the discussion is familiar to me, because I explained this part point-to-point to my London roommate in a hostel bar in Austria in 2004). The first is existential commitment, which is basically to refuse to answer the question. Now there are some things that existential commitment is good for, not least of all acting as a stopgap explanation as one works out a more detailed metaethic. "This is where I stand; I can do no other" is a principled position I can respect, but it ideally shouldn't take the place of critical dialectic and self-exploration.

Now obviously someone working from a position of existential commitment can make normative claims; there's nothing stopping them, after all. But they can't quite give an account of why other people should take them seriously, so they're only useful in modifying the behavior of other people who share those commitments. This strikes me as a rather weak and silly sort of radical feminism (but perhaps describes the traditional, "real" radfeminists of the 70s quite well!).

The second option would be some sort of foundationalism. But as you note, foundationalism isn't really compatible with the core premise of radical feminism, that systemic injustice runs all the way down. (Although nowadays I would probably want to hedge on it a little and say something like it might run all the way down, and if it doesn't it still runs down pretty darn deep.) To locate supposedly "feminist" ethics in reason, language, or culture would be to merely reinscribe masculinist domination.

When I was in undergrad, it seemed to me the process was simple: you let feminist ethicists do their thing, and then we feminist metaphysicians and theologians would apply the results to metaphysics, epistemology, and theology. (Aesthetics always seemed to fit very uncomfortably into this system.) The idea of deriving ethics from religion still sort of gives me hives, but it's obvious that the system as I was thinking of it just isn't tenable: it throws way too much burden on the feminist ethicists. Standpoint theory has too many implicit metaphysical and epistemological assumptions to be able to do what it does and be logically prior to those disciplines. Appointing ethics as queen of the science isn't ultimately a meaningful change, any more than demoting metaphysics and putting epistemology in its place, or doing the same with philosophy of language, had been. As long as the sciences have a queen, we have a problem.

Ultimately, then, I think the only workable option is a dialectical one. Reason (and I'll use that as a lump term for metaphysics/epistemology/theology) and ethics always have to be in dialectic to each other, with neither (or, in another sense, both) being logically prior to the other. (So, gritting my teeth, I have to accept that it is sometimes acceptable to turn to Scripture in order to learn about ethics--but this turn to Scripture will always-already be informed by a certain ethicism.) The limits of liberal democratism are built into itself and reveal themselves in history, so that there is a sort of imperative built within reason, language, and culture themselves for it to progress into radical feminism.

Comments

[alixtii.livejournal.com]

Okay, I'm home from work now, and I think I hit most of the points I wanted to make. To make it clear, it's not necessarily that I believe in metaethical principles because of my ethical commitments. I mean, that's true, but it's more that, as a result of my rejection of positivism as self-contradicting, non-empirical principles must exist. Which metaethical principles I believe in is determined by my ethical commitments, a fact which is itself a metaethical principle, and thus determined by my ethical commitments. . . .

I would argue--even if I'm not sure how to demonstrate--that your position is necessarily inconsistent, in that insofar as we're having this conversation in language, it's always-already implicitly and intrinsically ideological; it's built into the landscape. From your perspective, what does it really mean to "understand" my position--we're just altering each other's brain chemistries by modifying the patterns of the photons hitting each other's retinae (retinas?), right? (Which, obviously, is going on, but that's not the point.)

[http://users.livejournal.com/peasant_/]

I've delayed answering partly because of RL and partly in the hope that inspiration would strike and I could start to understand you position a bit better. Needless to say I don't think it has. I suspect this may be one of those things where we are never going to 'get' the other's view. needless to say that does not mean we should stop trying, but I have to confess I am no longer optimistic.

For now, I'll concentrate on the smaller stuff and see if an overall pattern becomes clearer to me.

I shall start by splitting a hair because it is there to be split.
as a result of my rejection of positivism as self-contradicting, non-empirical principles must exist
Ouch. If your sole rejection of positivism is that it is self-contradicting then logically you can only conclude that non-empirical principles could exist, not that they must. If you are going to say 'must' then you need some element of proof.

I would argue--even if I'm not sure how to demonstrate--that your position is necessarily inconsistent, in that insofar as we're having this conversation in language, it's always-already implicitly and intrinsically ideological; it's built into the landscape. From your perspective, what does it really mean to "understand" my position--we're just altering each other's brain chemistries by modifying the patterns of the photons hitting each other's retinae (retinas?), right? (Which, obviously, is going on, but that's not the point.)
The only possible answer to that is 'Yes. So?' Because as far as I'm concerned we are indeed talking in language and it is therefore shot through with our cultural and biological histories (which is what I take to mean by 'built into the landscape') so each one of us is bringing vast accumulations of 'stuff' to the conversation in addition to our own personal experiences and opinions, just as we do to any conversation. And all of it as far as I'm concerned has an origin, there are no Ouroboors floating in space without any history, just chains of cause and effect. So if I want to understand the origins of ideas I look to social history, and behind that to ecological imperatives and brain chemistry, with which, of one could trace it back far enough, one could find the origins of conscious thought. None of which would matter in terms of difference between my views and whatever it is that you in fact believe except that we are talking about ethical issues, we are not just saying 'this is' but 'this is and it is right or wrong'. Now under my system, the closest I can come to 'right' is 'currently acceptable by the society I live in' or 'something that I perceive will be to my advantage or the advantage of those I care about' (the two are of course frequently the same). And I have to acknowledge that my value of 'right' may therefore change over the course of time, as indeed history shows me has happened for as far back as we can observe. I'm not quite sure what you standard for 'right' is but it seems to be more along the lines of 'something I feel to be right after due consideration', and I am still very unsure where you believe these ideas to have their origins. If I can understand where you think your ideas come from, and if I can relate it to where I understand ideas to come from, then I will feel in a position to both 'understand' why you believe the things you do and to make up my own mind in a more informed manner as to whether or not I agree with you.

[alixtii.livejournal.com]

Ouch. If your sole rejection of positivism is that it is self-contradicting then logically you can only conclude that non-empirical principles could exist, not that they must. If you are going to say 'must' then you need some element of proof.

Unless we're going to go down some Godelian path where something can be true without the proposition asserting it being true, then no. If the proposition that there are no non-empirical principles, being itself a non-empirical principle, is logically incoherent (which it is) and thus false, then there MUST be a nonzero number of non-empirical principles.

This IS a proof--a proof by contradiction. Of course since I'm not sure that you acknowledge the laws of logic, as non-empirical principles, exist (either contingently or universally, I don't care which), this might mean not mean anything to you; OTOH, I can't imagine having a meaningful conversation about anything, let alone philosophy, with someone who rejects the laws of logic.

If I can understand where you think your ideas come from, and if I can relate it to where I understand ideas to come from, then I will feel in a position to both 'understand' why you believe the things you do and to make up my own mind in a more informed manner as to whether or not I agree with you.

I think that ethics come from, ultimately, the structure of language and reason. Now, I don't think that language and reason are divorced from our cultural and biological histories, but that they do sort of push us into certain non-empirical principles which are sort of contingently categorical.

For example, my language furnishes me with concepts such as "2" and "4" such that I'm forced into thinking of the latter as being the former multiplies by itself. Insofar as I understand the concepts, there is no need to turn to the world and without understanding the concepts no amount of turning to the world is going to do me any good. My language also furnishes me with the language with which to critique a theory of mathematics and maybe, if I were better at math, to go about constructing a new one. (I have read feminist critiques of mathematics, but like everyone else, I have no idea what a feminist math would look like or how it would be different than normal math.)

I think ethical premises work in more or less the same way, the result of linguistic structures which structure thought. Because of this, ethical principles are always-already built into our language games.

[http://users.livejournal.com/peasant_/]

I think that ethics come from, ultimately, the structure of language and reason. Now, I don't think that language and reason are divorced from our cultural and biological histories, but that they do sort of push us into certain non-empirical principles which are sort of contingently categorical...[example of maths]...I think ethical premises work in more or less the same way, the result of linguistic structures which structure thought. Because of this, ethical principles are always-already built into our language games.

Ah! I think I am fumbling towards understanding you in terms that actually make sense to me. So, let me see if I've got this right: you believe that reason and language, arising as they do from our cultural and biological histories, reveal things which we can call categorical ethical truths because when examined by that reason and language they reveal themselves to be consistent.

Yes, no or marmalade?

[alixtii.livejournal.com]

Yes, or at least mostly. I suppose I don't believe they're completely consistent, or else there would be no reason (or ability, really) to critique the system itself, as feminists do, using radical critique from a position within the system. So we can use our categorical ethical truths to look at the way they themselves were produced by history, and how we might need to change that process to produce new categorical ethical truths. . . .

But I think you're understanding me. (I thought the math example might be useful. . . .)

[http://users.livejournal.com/peasant_/]

Hurrah!

I suppose I don't believe they're completely consistent, or else there would be no reason (or ability, really) to critique the system itself, as feminists do, using radical critique from a position within the system.

I'm so glad you clarified this because that was going to be my next question.

I thought the math example might be useful. . . .

Actually it was more cumulative from everything you have been saying than just that particular example. I spent an embarrassingly long time with the comment reply window open writing and rewriting replies until something clicked. The example you gave didn't quite work because I always feel that basic arithmetic is actually founded in simple observation because that is how small children learn - by counting beans or whatever - and thus it is eminently testable. I had to go off and invent an example of my own using Pi (don't ask, I'm not a mathematician so I probably got it wrong anyway) and then come back and reread again.

Anyway, given all of which - vital question:

Whose language and reason?

Just your own, or a carefully chosen sample? And do you expect there to be differences between the language and reason of different individuals, since that would presumably result in different ethical truths. Are these categorical ethical truths only categorical for you in your own reference (which would bring us back to the problem of how to persuade others)? Or categorical for yourself and people with a sufficiently similar background (which I think is a perfectly legitimate position - we live in a society and much value is to be made of working with that particular society)? Or do you expect them to be categorical for every human being?

If you are sampling, how are you sampling? Whose work are you basing this on?

Do you expect these categorical ethical truths to stand for all time or will they change as language and reason develop? If you concede they change, at what rate do you think they change? Very fast - as fast as the understanding of an individual can change (you and I are not the same people as we were when we started this conversation because after the exchange of information we both now look at the world with slightly different perspectives etc.). Or very slow - at evolutionary speed which for most practical purposes is ahistorical. Or somewhere in between, at the speed that societies evolve.

[alixtii.livejournal.com]

Whose language and reason? Just your own, or a carefully chosen sample?

I don't believe (drawing on Wittgenstein's private language argument) that language and reason can ever be held singularly by just one person; it's the fact they are in (in whatever part) common with at least one other person that make them language and reason. And so we get a sense of linguistic communities who share a common language and reason. I do think that the vast majority (if perhaps not all) of 21st century Earthlings actually share to a large degree many of the deeper structures of a common language and reason; at the same time, there's a very clear sense in which you and I, despite speaking very similar forms of English, are speaking different languages.

To think of it in terms of language, obviously everyone has their own unique idiolect. But they might belong to a group with a specialized jargon, and also (usually) speak within a certain dialect, which may be part of a sub-language like a pigdin or creole, which is part of a language or languages, which fall under a family of languages like Indo-European.

Do you expect these categorical ethical truths to stand for all time or will they change as language and reason develop?

Oh, they definitely change; that's a cornerstone of the approach, I think. (Someone like Kant would have thought they'd stand for all time.) (This opens up questions about how to talk about the morality of past actions performed in history, but I think the questions are largely academic; we judge past actions by our standards because they are ours, the most correct set of standards we [believe we] have access to. This doesn't, I don't think, require us to imagine an ideal ethics or a God's eye view or an endpoint to history or anything like that.)

If you concede they change, at what rate do you think they change?

32 feet per second per second? Honestly, I'm not quite sure how to answer the question. I suppose that I need to recognize that while I am arguing that any notion of "categoricalness" we might have has to be contingent and contextual, still some claims are more categorical than others. I don't see us throwing out modus ponens any time soon, while aesthetic tastes are notoriously fickle.

[alixtii.livejournal.com]

Or categorical for yourself and people with a sufficiently similar background (which I think is a perfectly legitimate position - we live in a society and much value is to be made of working with that particular society)?

This is where I put most of the work that needs to be done, I think. This is where Putnam's Australia comes into the picture. (Since I'm home, I'm able to finally pursue the reference.) He imagines this Australia is peopled by "super-Benthamites" who have worked out "an elaborate science" of morality based on utilitarian principles, so that acts such as torturing children can in certain situations be easily justified without any cognitive dissonance. He argues that in applying this science, they will have rendered their language radically different to our own:

Every super-Benthamite is familiar with the fact that sometimes the greatest satisfaction of the greatest number (measured in 'utils') requires one to tell a lie. And it is not counted as 'dishonest' in the pejorative sense to tell lies out of the motive of maximizing the general pleasure level. So after a while the use of the term 'honest' among the super-Benthamites would be extremely different from the use of the same descriptive term among us. And the same will go for 'considerate', 'good citizen', etc. The vocabulary available to the super-Benthamites for the description of people-to-people situations will be quite different from the vocabulary available to us. Not only will they lack, or have altered beyond recognition, many of our descriptive resources, but they will very likely invent new jargon of their own (for example, exact terms for describing hedonic tones) that are unavailable to us. The texture of the human world will begin to change. In the course of time the super-Benthamites and we will end up living in different human worlds.

In short, it will not be the case that the super-Benthamites and we 'agree on the facts and disagree on the values'. In the case of almost all interpersonal situations, the description we give of the facts will be different than the description they give of the facts. Even if none of the statements they make about the situation are false, their description will not be one that we will count as adequate and perspicuous; and the description we give will not be one they could count as adequate and perspicuous. In short, even if we put aside our 'disagreement about the values', we could not regard their total representation of the human world as fully rationally acceptable. [. . . T]he inability of the super-Benthamites to get the way the human world is right is a direct result of their sick conception of human flourishing.

Insofar as people speak the same language, there is a sufficiently similar background on which to make a case. People who are really theocrats in liberal democrats' clothing may well be unpersuadable; neoliberals, on the
other hand, probably have a sufficiently similar paradigm for a conversation to be possible. Indeed, that's my central argument: that liberal democracy in particular contains within itself its own contradictions which give birth to radical feminism and the quest for systemic justice.

Or do you expect them to be categorical for every human being?

I don't reject this out of hand, but there is something un-postmodern and un-radical feminist about it, I think. Still, I'm not quite as radical as I once was when I was younger, and if the entire system doesn't need to be demolished, then it seems needlessly destructive to throw out the whole thing. (I don't think we could throw it out all at once, but we could concievably replace it piece by piece like the Ship of Theseus.) My claim is only something along the lines of that everything we think is categorical for every human being, forever and ever world without end, isn't necessarily so.

And now I need to get ready for church.

[alixtii.livejournal.com]

And I should add that the Putnam quote is from Reason, Truth, and History, pp. 140-141.