"If it includes everything, it becomes meaningless."

[alixtii]

There is a claim I've seen being made a lot lately, in a lot of different places (but part of the same overall argument) by different people, that if a word applies to everything it becomes meaningless. Can anyone explain this claim to me?

If I say "everything is made up of atoms" does that mean "made up of atoms" is a meaningless category?

I remember having a conversation on the OTW FAQ and the language it uses, referring to what I would call source texts as "original works" and thus inadvertently imply intentionality which isn't truly there in the case of many RPF canons, in the comments of this post, with jadelennox, in which she said:

The jargon term "text" encompasses the idea that all objects, experiences, encounters, etc. are analyzable under the same lens is we would use to analyze the non-jargon "texts". There really isn't any jargon-free way to say "I mean everything in the world, except everything in the world from the point of view that you can look at everything in the world as a text". I'm not even explaining it well when I try to translate it into a whole lot of English words. *shakes tiny fist*

Is the "except [. . .] from the point of view that you can look at everything in the world as a text" part of her definition really lacking any semantic content?

If I say everything is about sex, or the death-drive, or the means of production, or the will-to-power, am I making meaningless statements?

If everything is X then, a) that may say something meaningful about the state of everything, and b) that doesn't eliminate the possibility that some things are more X than others, closer to the center of the conceptual web, less problematically X, while others lurk in the fuzzy boundaries.

Or am I just insane?

Comments

[alixtii.livejournal.com]

The discussion quoted above, between jadelennox and me, started when someone objected to the term "original work" since RPF doesn't respond to "original works." I pointed out that "source text" is better but too academic-y when OTW already has a reputation as being too acafannish.

But it's an example. In the conversations going on more recently in which I've seen (several) people making "If everything is X, then X is meaningless" arguments, the X has been "queer." Those portions of the conversations I have stayed out of myself, as I mention below, (although I've engaged in other portions) because they are made in the context of other arguments about appropriation which demand respectful listening in my opinion, and to make this argument there would, IMHO, derail the discussion.

One of the things I like about having you as a flister is that when I talk about an issue in the abstract like this, divorcing it from context on the assumption that the people who know the context will understand what prompted it, you'll tackle it in the abstract head-on and we're start talking about the actual underlying meaty issues that everyone else was talking around by focusing on the specifics. Because I think the underlying disagreements tend to be not so much political as philosophical.

It is only a meaningful statement if it is really true that everything can be analysed in that way. That is what I was saying in my comment above. Now I'm not what you call an academic, I have no idea what the tools X, Y and Z are or if they are indeed universally applicable. I rather doubt they are universally applicable, but if you say they are then I will take your word for it.

Talk to a Freudian, and she'll be convinced that you want to sleep with your mother. (Not really, but capturing the nuances of Freud isn't the point here.) Whatever you say, she'll be able to create an explanation how all that is motivated by her initial premise. So in a sense she has tools universally applicable to analyze all of human behavior. (Hell, there's really nothing to stop from applying Freud to gods or astrological bodies, either.)

That's not quite an empirical fact about the universe or human behavior.

[http://users.livejournal.com/peasant_/]

One of the things I like about having you as a flister is that when I talk about an issue in the abstract like this ... you'll tackle it in the abstract head-on

Hah!

I once was set a question on a maths exam asking for the height of a tent pole given a certain width of tent, I responded with two pages, closely written, considering all the different possible shapes of tent and laying out the different geometrical calculations required for each one. The teacher claimed afterwards that it was obvious what shape of tent had been intended. Some people are just incapable of seeing the wood for the nearest tree.

Because I think the underlying disagreements tend to be not so much political as philosophical.

I absolutely agree. I happen to have seen some of the discussions about appropriation of the term 'queer' and they are all balancing at the top of such a huge pile of assumptions, preconceptions and general guff that it is very hard to make much sense of them beyond picking up a general impression that some people have clearly had their feelings hurt. As luck would have it I do have the necessary personal qualification that allows me to know why they were hurt, but those discussions are no place for logic. And as with all discussions of that nature they will be very unpleasant experiences for anyone rash enough to join in without the necessary qualification. You are wise to keep quiet.

In that context I think 'meaningless' means 'does not provide me with the necessary self-identification that I am used to having from the word'. I do not think you need to look for any deeper intention than that.


So in a sense she has tools universally applicable to analyze all of human behavior. (Hell, there's really nothing to stop from applying Freud to gods or astrological bodies, either.)
Granted. But she will not be able to use that tool to analyse the wave form of a beam of light. She can analyse the human reaction to such a wave form, but not the wave form itself. Hence her tool can not analyse everything. In the same way, not everything can be a text because somewhere there is something that cannot be analysed with the tools that define what a text is. The only way to incorporate absolutely everything into the definition of text is by making that definition so loose that nothing is excluded. Then you are saying everything = everything, which is meaningless because it provides no useful information. Of course everything = everything. If you redefine 'text' as everything then 'text' becomes redundant as a word. But in truth you do not wish to redefine text or queer or any other word to mean everything, you simply wish to redefine it with a wider meaning than the current one. Your academic definition of text is very broad - excitingly broad - but it does not include everything. If it did, it would indeed be meaningless.

[http://users.livejournal.com/peasant_/]

And come to think of it, a Freudian would probably have a field day with the human reaction to the wave form of a beam of light!

[alixtii.livejournal.com]

I'm not convinced the Freudian analyst can't analyze the beam of light. From my perspective any such analysis would be silly and even possibly stupid or insane, but not necessarily self-contradictory.

That's why it is ideological, because yes, it is rooted in tautologies. But it would be wrong, imho, to say that these tautologies provide no useful information, because they have consequences.

Hmm. If I say "Everything can have a poem written about it," that seems to actually encompass everything, doesn't it?

[http://users.livejournal.com/peasant_/]

Hmm. If I say "Everything can have a poem written about it," that seems to actually encompass everything, doesn't it?

Nope. Writing a poem about something pretty much means 'describing' so then you run into Schroedinger's cat and the uncertainty principle and that sort of thing. Or to give a simple exception, you couldn't write a poem about an idea that has not been expressed yet, or a phenomenon that has not yet been observed.

There are probably plenty of other exceptions. Everything is just too broad a concept :o)

Besides, why aim for everything? Half the fun is in defining.

[alixtii.livejournal.com]

Well, the problem of that which transcends language is something 20th century philosophy, especially continental philosophy, fixates on, so I'm not unaware of the problem.

You seem to be operating from the assumption that everything is sitting out there waiting to be named--so that "Idea that has not been expressed yet, You'll be great I bet" isn't actually about the referent you had in mind. And that's an ideological assumption--as all statements about everything inevitably are.

And that's why everything-statements are useful and meaningful: they provide the premises from which everything follows. (OMG, I just resurrected the synthetic a priori, didn't I?) (Just kidding. It was never dead for me. Just . . . contingent.)

[http://users.livejournal.com/peasant_/]

OMG, I just resurrected the synthetic a priori, didn't I?

You did, and it's a load of old Kant ;o)

I am not saying that there are not meaningful statements that can be applied to 'everything that can be described', and that would indeed be an important part of the definition and description of 'everything that can be described'. Given time and a patient audience one could probably say quite a lot that was meaningful about 'everything that can be described'. But there is a significant difference between 'everything that can be described' and 'everything'. So that even if those parts of 'everything' that cannot currently be described would indeed behave as predicted when they became describable, at the present moment in time - which is what matters to us - since they are not describable they are not encompassed by any other description than 'everything'. That, I think, is the difference between what you are saying and Kant - he was focussing on prediction, you are trying to find universal statements that do not allow the leeway of prediction but are genuinely universal.

Hence...
And that's why everything-statements are useful and meaningful: they provide the premises from which everything follows.
The problem with such a statement is that it is only provable if you can come up with such a non-trivial everything statement. Can you?

Certainly 'everything is text' is not one. Something that is not describable cannot be a text, even if we can predict that it will become a text if it ever does become describable. (And it is beyond laughable to suggest that 'everything is queer' is one!)

Which of course is why people start to reach for meta-physics at this point...


Have I mentioned that I dislike philosophy intensely?

[alixtii.livejournal.com]

But there is a significant difference between 'everything that can be described' and 'everything'.

Again, that's a prior ideological commitment flavoring one's definition of "everything." Which is inevitable--but the results are not self-evident until one has already accepted the definition.

[http://users.livejournal.com/peasant_/]

Again, that's a prior ideological commitment flavoring one's definition of "everything."

True. Which adds to the charge that the phrase 'Everything is X' is meaningless, if you are using 'X' not to describe 'everything' but merely to define 'everything', it either takes you away from the current definition of everything or it expands the definition of 'X' until it is worthless and the statement becomes a tautology.

At which point I think I want my lunch.

[alixtii.livejournal.com]

I'd agree that it functions primarily as a theoreticall statement. I think "everything is made up of atoms" functions the same way; atoms are defined as those things out of which everything else is made uip. IT's not as if atoms and everything are floating in some real world somewhere, and we already have the concepts 'atom' and 'everything' in our head, and we go to the real world to see how they hook up. It's a statement of scientific theory, not scientific empiricism.

But it's still not meaningless. (Again, the synthetic a priori, but instead of one permanently fixed into our conceptual catefories, one which is contingent and arbitrary.)

[http://users.livejournal.com/peasant_/]

Ah, I think I may have got it. everything is made up of atoms is not meaningless because the statement by its very existence defines what you mean by 'everything'. There are after all plenty of things that are not made up of atoms - subatomic particles, energy in all its various forms, time - a physicist could doubtless list others, and I know that you know this because you said do up above. So the statement has defined what you personally mean by 'everything' for the purpose of this conversation. You have narrowed your 'everything' down to a very specific subset of the available interpretations. That, I agree, is frequently a very useful thing to do. It provides the boundaries for the discussion, tells me something about yourself and how you think, and has value in a conversational sense. Is that what you meant by 'not meaningless'?


I have just realised that the above argument is dependent on the scientific definition of atoms and it is possible that you meant the philosophical definition. I am assuming however that you meant the scientific because of your statement that it was scientific theory not scientific empiricism. If you meant the philosophical definition then as far as I can see we are back to a tautology and you will have to try to explain again, preferably using smaller words and plenty of pictures :oD

[http://users.livejournal.com/peasant_/]

(Just kidding. It was never dead for me. Just . . . contingent.)

It always saddens me that you are not an atheist or an agnostic. You would make such a good agnostic.

[alixtii.livejournal.com]

Well, in terms of belief, as opposed to faith, I am an agnostic.

[http://users.livejournal.com/peasant_/]

That is one of the most revealing remarks I have ever seen you make. (I don't mean that in a bad way.) I am going to try to bear that in mind because it explains an awful lot about where you are coming from and why.