Classism and Realism

[alixtii]

There's some metafandom-ed posts about Supernatural and class, and at least one flocked post on my flist thinking about it in the abstract, and it's gotten me to revisit my thoughts, because class really does color the way I view fictional characters quite deeply. Well, maybe not class per se, since I've said things like that in the past and been forced to take them back, but classed markers certainly, even as I'm still not at all sure the distinction makes any sense. (Not gender per se but gendered markers? Not race but racialized markers? What are gender, race, and class except a set of markers? Is there such a thing as class essentialism?) Education, idiolect, certain values, cultural capital--things like that--with the archetypal example being high-school student Buffy Summer's ability to make topical allusions to Arthur Miller or Samuel Beckett. (So admittedly it is a very narrow set of classed--and raced and gendered, but especially classed and raced--markers that make me interested in a fictional character.)

Now, the thing I'm still struggling with is how problematic that fact is. It seems acceptable to say "I'm not interested in watching a show about working-class characters" in a way it would never be to say "I'm not interested in watching a show about women" or "I'm not interested in watching a show about characters of color." But as a person of immense privilege, the fact that it seems acceptable may be no more than an indicator of how far I still have to go--the way that replacing "white" and "black" for "men" and "women" in a certain situation can make it much clearer how problematic it is, as in this comment to a languagelog post:

In general, though, I would say there is clearly much more public tolerance in the US for prejudice against women and misogynistic speech than there is tolerance for racist speech. This was most clearly illustrated to me in a story a professor of mine in University told of an administrative meeting he attended where one of the speakers was discussing a vote that had taken place and in relation to that made a joke about how giving women the right to vote had been a mistake, and was met with genuine laughter. He noted, truthfully I think, that this would have been met with awkward incredulity if it were instead about African Americans or some other racial group.

Of course, the degree to which this works will depend on just how "real" one considers sexual difference to be, as evidenced by all the people who disagree with me on whether there will be gender-segregated bathrooms in the feminist utopia. (Of course, insofar as the point of gender-segregated bathrooms is to keep the other sex out, I'd argue there's something hugely heterosexist as well as sexist going on there.) (And if we look at the way racial difference went from seeming quite real to the idea being almost absurd, I don't see why the same process couldn't play out wrt gender.)

Still, it seems to be natural and unproblematic to say "it's better to be rich than to be poor" (even though what I'm really interested and invested in has nothing to do with income except insofar as hip-hop music has something to do with race or skirts have to do with gender) in a way one can't even say, say, "it's better to see than to be blind." (Not that I'd want to say the latter, mind you--I've learned better--but I think it's still intuitive for a lot of people.) And I can only doubt my privilege so much.

In the end, I suppose it comes down to the fact that while the "reality" of sexuality difference is more or less irrelevant to gender inequality (by which I mean that having a penis doesn't convey in itself any real power), and thus the semiotic power of gendered markers are able to function more or less independently of that reality, and the reality of racial difference (none at all chromosomally) is in some ways more and some ways less divorced from racial inequality, Not having a penis is only a lack once you've read Lacan. Similarly with not being white. Not having money, on the other hand--well, obviously this too is a lack which is in large part semiotic, since currency doesn't have any intrinsic value, as you can't eat or drink it--not having the stuff which money can buy to satisfy one's needs and wants, however, represents a real imbalance in power which is not present in the raced or gendered scenarios. And "classism" as a superstructural system of injustice where the rich think the poor are ignorant trash and the working-class think the upper class are pretentious twits sort of operates above this base.

Except that now I sound like some cross between a Lacanian, a classical Marxist, and a metaphysical realist (what is this "real" of which I speak?) and--perish the thought. And ultimately, this distinction does seem to be bogus. The phenomenology of women's lived experience under systemic injustice is that of a "real" lack, no more or less than the one that comes from not having money to spend. All the money in the world won't help you if your boyfriend won't let you out of the house to spend it.

Comments

[alixtii.livejournal.com]

Well, I'm not exactly sure what would be at the bottom of that slippery slope, so I'm not even sure whether would one want to avoid it. I think making assumptions about individuals tends to be uninteresting, irrelevant, and/or counterproductive; beyond that, though, is the disagreement only over what we are able to accept (and I'm not sure I even understand exactly what you mean by that)? Certainly I think there is a normative ethical imperative not to be a jerk and to work for justice; someone who is implicitly supporting the status quo is part of the problem.

[triestine.livejournal.com]

What I found strange in the original post is simple:

It seems acceptable to say "I'm not interested in watching a show about working-class characters" in a way it would never be to say "I'm not interested in watching a show about women" or "I'm not interested in watching a show about characters of color."

As I said, how is it not acceptable to say that one is not interested in watching, for example, shows about women? What is not acceptable about it? Disinterest in (x) is nothing like saying that (x) should not exist, or trying to dictate its content. What I fail to see is the unacceptability of disinterest - that is all I was trying to say.

It's not commendable, certainly, but it's a stretch to think of it as malicious. That's where the 'slope' appears: implying support of a problem in any capacity when considering a lack of interest is an accusation, which is worse than an assumption. Does it mean, among other things, that when one chooses which causes to support (and in doing so drops others), that the resulting disinterest is support of the problematic status quo?

[alixtii.livejournal.com]

It's not commendable, certainly, but it's a stretch to think of it as malicious.

I'm scratching my head trying to think where I ever attributed malice to anyone. Something doesn't need to be malicious to be unacceptable; indeed, those forms of injustice which are still motivated by real malice tend to strike me as relatively uninteresting. It's the unintentional perpetuation of unjust structures which I'm most interested in opposing; I hope and pray we've already enacted enough social change for the more overt sort of intolerance to die out on its own, even as I fear that as long as the more subtle forms of injustice remain in our society it will create spaces for the more extreme forms to flourish.

Indeed, it strikes me that more often than not, malicious injustice is a sign of progress: a slaveowner (for example) can truly believe they are doing the loving thing toward their slaves (not to mention wife and children); it's only when oppressed groups begin to exercise their autonomy that hate appears.

Does it mean, among other things, that when one chooses which causes to support (and in doing so drops others), that the resulting disinterest is support of the problematic status quo?

I'm not sure I would claim that (even if it is--and I'm not sure that it is--the logical endpoint of what I've said, there may well be something I've said which is not necessary to the main thrust of my argument and which I would reject upon reflection), but neither does it strike me as the reductio ad absurdum you seem to be treating it as. I'm not saying that no one who falls short of being a moral superbeing deserves to live--there'd be no one left in that case--just that we should be aware of our failings. There are only so many hours in a day and, yes, some things need to be dropped in favor of others--but never should we treat those choices as innocent, because they aren't: they reflect our values, our upbringing, and our culture in sometimes painful ways.

Mostly, my concern is more for the log in my own eye (and I never for a moment doubt it's there; it is hard to unlearn white het male privilege even when one has had the benefit of being raised by a feminist mother) than the speck in my neighbor's, to fix problems and oppose systemic injustice rather than to lay blame: blame is an instrument of an unjust, patriarchal system.

As I said, how is it not acceptable to say that one is not interested in watching, for example, shows about women?

First off, this was more an empirical statement about a specific set of social norms than anything else: if you say you're not interested in female characters in the femslash and meta circles I frequent, the response will probably be the equivalent of an eyeroll; if you say you're not interested in characters of color, you'll probably be lucky to get off with the eyeroll. However, there is an underlying logic to these norms which I think is objectively right (for some suitably postmodern value of "objectively right"--on the offchance you care, you can find a detailed discussion of my metaethics here), so it's worth going into.

Again, the claim isn't really that no--not one--collection of the words "I'm not interested in X" in that order where X is a group of marginalized/oppressed people should ever under any circumstances be uttered in discourse. What I am saying is that it is a warning signal like saying "I'm not a racist but...." and the influences leading up to such a statement will be quite rightly automatically suspect--even if in a small number of cases those influences may be unproblematic--because in the vast majority of cases such a statement will be able to be traced back to underlying systemic structures of injustice at work in our society. (Again, this doesn't make one a horrible person; it just means they're human in an injust global culture.)