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Adapted from this LibraryThing thread.
I happen to think the moral strictures, at least, of the Bible are on the whole pretty darn clear, as opposed to being, you know, valent, whether multi, poly, bi (not that there’s anything wrong with it), tri, or any other variation on same: Do not murder, do not have sex with someone else’s spouse, lay off of worshipping big wooden statues, don’t lie with beasts, and don’t lie (if you’re a male) with other males (especially if they’re angels and especially if it’s non-consensual).
In one sense, I agree with this, in that I'm distrustful of the project which claims we can apply a conservative hermeneutic to Scripture and still get liberal conclusions--the What the Bible Really Says about Homosexuality project, where it seems to be conceded that the Bible could condemn homosexuality, but it's a contingent fact that it doesn't. Whew! What a relief. [On the flist, I know that hermionesviolin is a big proponent of this view. Sorry, Elizabeth. --ed.]
But I'm not sure that "clear" and "multivalent" are actually mutually exclusive. It seems to me possible that a certain reading could be clear and at the same time God could be using it to say or do something completely different than the "clear" reading suggests. If one finds evolving revelation problematic, then the fact that God seemingly eschews being clear could be problematic. But since my faith commitments (which are fairly orthodox in this respect at least) don't lead me to do so, the problem disappears.
It seems to me "clear" and "multivalent" measure different things; the former measures plausibility (which I think the religionist by virtue of being a religionist has already abandoned [another point I think Elizabeth would disagree with me on--ed.]) and the latter possibility (which is the space in which religion thrives).
Leviticus is pretty explicit on male homosexuality: "don't do it." But as liberal apolgists are probably too prone to point out, it's in a list that also forbids wearing polyester. Is the doctrine of dispensationalism which supposedly frees us from the polyester rule something read into the Bible, or a direct exegesis of the New Testament? I don't pretend to know. Is the division between ethical and non-ethical rules that exempts the homosexuality clause from dispensationalism exegetical or eisegetical? Again, I don't know. I don't think there's a right answer. (Well, actually, I'm fond of "It's all eisegetical.")
But what I'm left with is that the Bible never says anything simply; interpretation is always required. We don't get very far before my "obvious" reading and your "obvious" reading no longer line up very well.
I don't want to deny that the "condemnation of homosexuality" reading is the most intuitive one. I don't know if this fact says more about us (and what we find intuitive) or Scripture, but to deny it would be disingenuous. All I'm trying to claim is that alternate readings are valid. Which reading we choose will say a lot about who we are as Christians, obviously.
Now, it may be that there are texts that, as modern thinking Christians, we might decide are so inherently problematic that they can't possibly be part of God's Word. I won't rule it out completely. But such a move should only be made as a last possible resort, I think; as long as there are ways to constructively re-vision our understanding of a passage, that should be the preferable route.
Scripture, as compiled under the watchful eye of Mother Church, is important because it is, not solely but nonetheless very importantly, what we as Christians draw on and look back to as part of what defines us. But this is a wrestling with God, not a list of directives. Penuel, not Sinai.
I think we need to be honest about this, and admit that our interpretations are born as much from our moral commitments (both personal and communal--and we cannot forget that Mother Church, fractured and divided as she is*, is guided by the Holy Spirit) as they are from any type of straight, direct exegesis. (These commitments are not prior to our interpretation of Scripture, but rather in constant unending dialect with it.) But I also believe that that's the only game in town.[This brings us to Alixtii's peculiar brand of meta/ethics.--ed.]
[*Yes, there's gendered language there. There's something in the gendered language which I think is particularly effective at conveying a particular (Anglo-Catholic) understanding of the composition of the Church. At the same time, all that bride of Christ stuff is so deeply problematic from a feminist viewpoint. Still at the same time, I didn't actually mention any of that bride of Christ stuff, nor would I ever (although I do refer to the Church as "His Church" upthread), just a positive feminine embodiment of a religious concept, and stripping our religious language of positive feminine embodiments of religious concepts is problematic in its own right. I still don't know how I feel about it all, except that there's part of me that feels really comfortable talking about Mother Church.--ed.]
(no subject)
Date: 2009-03-01 02:39 pm (UTC)This cuts straight to the quick as to my critique of radical politics. While I for the most part agree with their modes of analysis, it's hard to see the traditional 1970s radical feminists as arguing anything other than the latter claim--that negotiating on behalf of the disempowered with the powerful is playing into the existing power structures, which need to be torn down in toto, don't ask me how.
As a result, traditional radical feminists eschew pursuing change through legislation or litigation. I'd probably agree that liberal feminism is a little too law-happy, to the detriment of enacting cultural change, but it's simply a fact that the most meaningful and important changes to a woman's lot in society have been wrought by liberal feminists working through the political system. No, it's not a throwing off of the yoke of the patriarchy, but in the meantime it's an important work of marcy, and by increasing the scope of women's ability to be actors culturally and politically increases the possibility in my mind of eventual radical change.
Furthermore, it's not as if the radical feminists have, as far as I can tell, a coherent agenda for cultural change either (at least if we discount lesbian separatism) beyond women telling their own stories--something vitally important, but not sufficient. Here too I think a series of negotiations and compromises are necessary; we can't just replace everything in the library with Margaret Atwood; we need the Joss Whedons, whose works are empowering and deeply problematic at the same time. Enacting cultural change requires speaking to people in a language they can understand, which requires a partial and temporary appropriation of the patriarchal mythos in order to deconstruct it.
Do you remember just how horrible Dissenter's Tolkein fanfic was?
As I wrote in my Non-Defense of the Organization for Transformative Works:
(no subject)
Date: 2009-03-06 08:00 am (UTC)I had pretty much come to the conclusion that radicals could only be either entirely theoretical or working towards revolution. I hadn't actually thought of the separatist lesbian utopia, but actually that makes a lot of sense and I suspect is the world view a lot of radicals in fact are falling back on, whether they realise it or not.
So, subsidiary question:
Do you think liberal feminists can in fact take their theories from radicals and still maintain their full ability to negotiate? The thing that has struck me about this empowered/disempowered binary is that it really undermines someone's ability to talk with (i.e. negotiate with) the empowered because it also breeds contempt and dislike for the power. And while many people can have respect for someone who disagrees with them, it is very rare indeed to respect someone who has no respect for your position in society.
Oddly enough this even holds true if the power is something you've only been granted by the very person being disrespectful of it - if I say 'you are more powerful than me because you were given a rubber toy dog as a child, and I despise you for it' you are going to be in no mood to listen to my criticisms of why you shouldn't have been given a toy dog, or why everyone should have been given one, even though up until that moment you had never given a moment's thought to your toy dog.
So radicalism poisons its own waters. The question is, does it also poison other people's? Can one take lessons from radicalism about what the world's problems are and still find a new way to actually solve them? Or should one turn away from radicalism as an intellectually fascinating but ultimately fruitless cul-de-sac and look for something entirely different?
And of course the danger of that is that if you manage to impose a law before the culture of society at large is ready for it, it will backfire far worse than any radical ranting on their soap box. Liberals have the potential to do more good, but they also have the potential to do more harm.
I'm not sure. I've been fumbling around thinking about this sort of thing for, what, two or three years now? And I sort of have the swirly shape of an understanding at the back of my brain but I can't bring it into proper focus. It is something to do with cultural expression, and negotiation not confrontation but negotiation without people even knowing they are being negotiated with. I kind of take Torchwood as my shiny example because I think that has done a brilliant job of negotiating for alternative sexualities, yet maybe that is just from my angle of looking at it. I know I've seen people who really didn't get 'the point' about sexuality in Torchwood. So maybe that isn't entirely the answer either.
I know a lot of things it's not - it's not confrontation, or expressing ones frustrations, or criticising other people's output, or doing anything to enforce, police or rely on the boundary between X and Y - but as you know, it is very easy indeed to criticise what other people are doing :D What I need to do is find some way to bring my own ideas into focus and work out what they actually are in detail so I can start applying them properly.
(no subject)
Date: 2009-03-14 06:36 pm (UTC)I think this conflates the power and the empowered a little too much. It sort of resembles the strawman (strawperson?) feminism where the patriarchy is understood to be a cabal of rich white men deliberately seeking to keep women down, or the stereotype of the man-hating feminist. I think there's a huge difference between a recognition of privilege and contempt.
And since privilege comes in so many shapes and colors, thinking of it as a binary is probably less than effective.
Can one take lessons from radicalism about what the world's problems are and still find a new way to actually solve them? Or should one turn away from radicalism as an intellectually fascinating but ultimately fruitless cul-de-sac and look for something entirely different?
I just don't see what that something could be. It might just be my own blindness, but it seems like it'd most likely develope into that "most of feminism's battles are fought and won" post-feminist nonsense and complacency which is so frustratingly common nowadays. Radical feminism reveals just how deep (thus the name) the problems with our society go. I don't see anything else (other than the other forms of radical leftist politics, of course, which I think need to stand in solidarity with feminism) able to fulfill that role.
But I don't see why seeing just how deep the problem runs prevents one from making temporary, short-term attempts at, if not solving it (planning for the revolution might still be in order), at least mitigating it. And like the ship of Theseus, this approach might allow us to, over time, radically replace all elements of our culture while still existing within it.
So, no, I don't see any real tension between a liberal politics and a radical theory.
(no subject)
Date: 2009-03-15 07:54 am (UTC)