(no subject)

[alixtii]

"Even if I could convince you that the fact-value dichotomy is without rational basis, that it is a rationally indefensible dichotomy, or even if some better philosopher than I could show this by an absolutely conclusive argument (of course there are no such in philosophy), still the next time you went out into the street, or to a cocktail party, or had a discussion at some deliberative body of which you happen to be a member, you would find someone saying to you, 'Is that supposed to be a statement of fact or a value judgment?' The view that there is no fact of the matter as to whether or not things are good or bad or better or worse, etc. has, in a sense, become institutionalized." -- Hilary Putnam

And such is the case in fandom as well, unfortunately. So much relativism.

I've been away for awhile, throwing myself into working my thesis as part of my Lenten experience. (The above quote is from my research.)

Comments

[thelastgoodname.livejournal.com]

I find this is interesting in light of our other discussion.

Additionally, (not that I've read Putnam) I'm not sure that there is actually much reference to the notion that people are so attuned to the distinctions between fact and value; most of what passes as either is confused with the alternative (there is no practical dichotomy in everyday discourse, they are assumed to be the same). Of course, I have no basis on which to say this, other than that fact-values are marshaled in policy discussions precisely to prove "better" or "worse."

[alixtii.livejournal.com]

Agreed. One of the things about Putnam is, he makes the claim that the fact/value distinction, and thus moral relativism, is endemic to our culture, and I just don't see it. Apparently our treatment of moral facts as values makes us treat them as relative, but I see plenty of people making normative statements every day.

There does, however, seem to be a stigma against producing normative statements within fandom, and I would agree with Putnam that aesthetic relativism is endemic. Of course there are good reasons for this: aesthetic relativism doesn't have the same problems and paradoxes as moral relativism, since there's no real aesthetic obligation to create good art in the way that moral obligation exists. I am myself an agnostic as to aesthetic values (i.e. whether they are facts or "just" contingent and sociohistorically-determined values). But it seems to me crucial for a healthy dialectic that there be somebody floating the possibility that aesthetic values are facts, and that normative statements (uttered with preoper humility) re: aren't aren't a priori illegitimate.