alixtii: The feet of John Henry and Savannah, viewed under the table, Savannah's not reaching the ground.  (Dark Champions)
[livejournal.com profile] deliriumdriver was discussing V for Vendetta (the movie version, not the comic) in a flocked post on her journal, and it had me thinking about my own reaction to the movie. No one (and by "no one" I mean "neither [livejournal.com profile] deliriumdriver nor I") denies that it's a powerful emotional experience while one is in the theatre, but there is a sense in which it sort of falls apart when one thinks about it afterwards. (As opposed to, say, Donnie Darko, which had me screaming at the screen all through the ostensibly science-fictional parts because they made NO SENSE WHATSOEVER.)

Politically I suspect I am sympathetic to the views of the filmmakers, and I don't have any problem in principle with a movie being intended to be used to promote a political agenda; the intentional fallacy almost ensures the result will be richer and broader than the filmmakers intended. Some of my favorite literary works, from Shaw's plays to Rand's novels, were intended to serve as polemics (but succeed as literature for me insofar as they are read as failing at those intended goals; Shaw was a horrible polemicist because he always gave the devil the best lines). After all, texts don't speak with moral voices, or rather with a unified moral voice, speaking differently to different people in different situations in different places and times (who speak, so to speak, different languages).

Although from an aesthetic viewpoint I suppose I prefer a little more ambiguity à la Shaw (although the movie did impose ambiguity at points, and I suppose asking for the ambiguity to be "resolved" would mean asking for the movie to no longer be ambiguous), but I don't know what political message the movie was trying to make--or, to avoid the intentional fallacy, I'm clueless how I should be constructing the author-function. I mean, texts don't speak with a moral voice in themselves, but the message to me in this socio-historical moment was . . . I'm not sure. I guess I walked away with a feeling that dystopian governments are bad. Which is all fine and good, but did I really need to be convinced of that? Does anyone?

The claim that there is a point at which a government's authority becomes illegitimate and the only solution is violent insurrection is one that I can respect (and which, at its extremes, I suppose I hold--as probably everyone who is not a pacifist does). But the movie doesn't seem to answer the question of at what point a government has usurped its own authority, so I don't quite see what the point of the exercise was. There are not-stupid arguments that we have already reached that point, as Bush (or at least, Bush's lawyers) seems to be of the opinion that under Article Four he has the right to do whatever he deems necessary without oversight which to me is an interpretation of the text which makes Roe v. Wade look downright conservative.

And on some levels I'm just an idealist: is it better to live in a flawed government (and how flawed is flawed?) or to die for an ideal one. I'm already on the record that I'd rather a person let the Earth be destroyed than compromise their ideals, and this seems to be a related sort of ethical dilemma. I'd rather let terrorists blow up America than let people's civil liberties be infringed upon*, because otherwise what we're left with isn't really America, the land of the free and the home of the brave. And practically speaking, I have to admit that this isn't a realistic perspective (hence the idealism).

*Anyway to rephrase this sentence so the preposition isn't at the end of the clause? It's one of those passive constructions I'm so interested in, like "who(m) was whispered to."

As far as I can tell, V for Vendetta just channels (from the viewpoint of the filmmakers [at least as I construct the author-function] righteous and legitmate) anger with Bush and the current administration to a strawman (which I suppose considering the tradition of Guy Fawkes' Day is somehow strangely appropriate) and if anything I think that hurts their (my?) cause, because I walked out of that that theatre complacent with my life (it was better than the fictional England!--even though on reflection I'm not 100% sure how so) rather than, say, formulating plans to blow up the White House (or, as a nice middle ground, ready to fill out a cheque to send to the ACLU). (Which reminds me I really should fill out a cheque to send to the ACLU. Why am I putting it off*?)

"Off" is acting as an adverb in this question, if I'm not mistaken. Or else "put it off" just counts as idiomatic.)

I think my initial response to V for Vendetta was that I was too close to the events to really judge, and I think that was a wise stance. I mean, Nineteen Eighty-Four--on which most of you know I did my honors thesis--is a pretty shallow book if one reads it as a diatribe against Communism (or the Catholic Church or the BBC), and my English teacher who said that Animal Farm isn't "really" about animals, but "really" about Russians, plain didn't understand symbolism. (Animal Farm is "really" about animals and figuratively about Russians--but it's also figuratively about a lot of other things since symbolism is never an A for B substitution the way metaphor is.) (And a simile is a type of metaphor, except insofar as it isn't really a type of figurative language since similes are literally true.) (Most of my teachers probably didn't understand symbolism, which signals to me either a) I don't understand symbolism, or b) our educational system--both public and private--is a mess.) Brave New World--well, one of the things I like about Brave New World is that I can't reduce it to a single line of thought; I have no clue against what Huxley thought he was complaining. He's a little like Shaw in that respect I suppose (and I suppose that Brave New World Revisited could be seen as the equivalent of one of Shaw's prologues).

So the conclusion, insofar as there is one, seems to be that I should stop searching for V for Vendetta's moral voice (because it doesn't have one) and enjoy it (or not enjoy it, whichever the case may be) solely as a work of art, one which asks questions but does not provide answers. This is, of course, the type of hermeneutical process I outlined in my honors thesis, suggested for use on the novel Nineteen Eighty-Four, based on part on this passage from Wittgenstein's Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus:
6.53 The correct method in philosophy would really be the following: to say nothing except what can be said, i.e. propositions of natural science—i.e. something that has nothing to do with philosophy—and then, whenever someone else wanted to say something metaphysical, to demonstrate to him [sic] that he [sic] had failed to give a meaning to certain signs in his [sic] propositions. Although it would not be satisfying to the other person—he [sic] would not have the feeling that we were teaching him [sic] philosophy—this method would be the only strictly correct one.
And because it seems an appropriate way to end this post, and because it's just that awesome, and because some of you might not be aware of it: Philosophy Songs, a site full of philosophical song parodies including "Antinomy" (to the tune of "Chim Chim Cheree"), "Solipsism is Painless," "Hume on the Brain," and (my favorite) "Supererogationisticextraobligation"!
alixtii: Mary Magdalene washing the face of Jesus of Nazareth, from the film production of Jesus Christ Superstar. (religion)
Leonardo Boff )

Immanuel Kant )

Max Weber )

Also, the "Add them as a friend" in my navbar uses singular they, which makes me happy.
alixtii: Avril Lavigne, wearing glasses, from the liner notes of "Let Go." Text: "Geek." (geek)
It's a common mistake that I'm sure I've made myself, but dangling parenthetheticals (or improperly nested parentheticals) really disrupt my reading process. I keep on waiting for the close parenthesis, and it never comes, and it's usually only a couple sentences further through the passage that I realize that the writer thinks they are writing non-parenthetically.

Now I'm off to finally see Superman Returns.
alixtii: Player from <i>Where on Earth Is Carmen Sandiego?</i> playing the game. (Default)
International Blog Against Racism Week is coming to a close. I like to think that every week is International Blog Against Sexism week in my journal, but race doesn't get mentioned all that often. I can't post with any particularly appropriate icons, for all the eight people who appear in my six icons are all white. While I think we are agreed that's deeply problematic, it is not as if going and getting an icon of a character I don't really like would solve anything. The issue is deeper, systemic, and blaming the individual never solves anything. (Not that I should be absolved of responsibility, either.) Changing my icons won't change anything; changing whatever made me not as interested in the non-white characters will, alongside an honest attempt to understand and appreciate the characters I might not "get."

(Honestly, this is how I see affirmative action most of the time. I don't oppose it anymore, because I think the restrictions on it by the Supreme Court are extremely fair, but I don't see it working particularly well, either.)

The closest character to a character of color whom I really loved is Kennedy, and she (and/or Iyari?) passed for white to me for the entire time I watched the show. I even sort of remember the "Really? Hmm" moment when I learned that Iyari Limon was Latina--and of course there are photo shoots of her that I've seen since which really accentuate it.(And there was a really great post about that and how problematic it is on my flist a couple days ago. Let me finish my thought and I'll hunt down the link.) Class issues intersect here--it was clearly established that Kennedy was at least upper-middle class, with a vacation house on Long Island, and there seems to be a weird (or not-so-weird, really, when one thinks about it) way that "upward" mobility requires a much greater enculturation in white culture (i.e., patriarchal hegemony) so that we would expect an upper-class Latina to pass for white better than a lower-class one.

Part of it is to whom I'm attracted; with the exception of the Mesektet/Dark Champions icon, all of my icons contain at least one character to whom I'm attracted. Why do I tend not to be attracted to people who are non-white (and when I do find such a person attractive, it is typically on "white" standards of beauty)? Well, "socialization" is the easy and obvious answer there, but I think the damage has been pretty much done by this point. Any suggestions as to how I can save future generations from this? (Of course, any evaluation of a person based on appearance is problematic from a feminist viewpoint, but it is not a practice from which we can very easily escape.)

Okay, so I wanted to use this time to revisit the question of whether texts can speak with moral voices, because that's part of what is at stake when we look at racism/sexism/classism in texts. There is nothing outside the text, so by definition every act of racism/sexism/classism is carried out via texts. And structural raceism/sexism/classism is built into the very language in which we create the texts, which presents those constructing the text with an interesting dilemma--we must work within the language so as to be communicative, but outside it so as to be liberatory. Twas brilig and the slithy toves did gyre and gimble in the wabe.

Sunnydale is a white, upper-middle-class community. Now there's some worldbuilding issues here, admittedly. We know that Sunnydale has people moving in and out a lot, and the property values are low, and I'm not an economics major so I don't know what it would take to keep up the upper-middle-class lifestyle that the residents of Sunnydale have. And it's been argued that geographically, there's no way a Californian suburb with that level of moving in and out could keep the level of racial homogeneity that it does. I don't know enough about California to speak to that issue. What I do know that here on the East Coast, there are plenty of towns just like Sunnydale.

To say that because Sunnydale is a white community that there is something oppressive with Buffy is ludicrous (and I'm not accusing anyone of making such an argument, just working through a train of thought.) Otherwise, only shows taking place in the Feminist Utopia would be proper, and I'm not sure that such a show would at all be entertaining. Instead, we must look at what function Sunnydale's whiteness performs. Insofar as Buffy is a subversive attack on the complacency of white middle class Americans, Sunnydale's whiteness is a suitably progressive source of satire. We know that the show called attention to the lack of diversity at least once, when Mr. Trick first entered Sunnydale.

If you're not convinced by this reading of Buffy I could go on, drawing on more details and whatnot. But as a result of various meta discussions, I'm not sure whether there is any correct reading. Buffy is a floating signifier, and as a result it says nothing and everything about race. A racist moving picture from the late 19th century might be the most powerful message against racism in the contemporary moment: it self-satirizes.

So what is a radical feminist to do, other than throw their hands up in despair? Nothing is forbidden, everything is permitted? Well, this is where the switch from theory to praxis comes in. (Although the way we conceptualize praxis--which is, of course, another type of text--is ultimately dependent on theory.) In this world, are people of color empowered or disempowered by the Buffy text? This is an empirical question that cannot be answered by watching Buffy alone, and as such, I have no idea what the answer is. And while I think censorship is always an evil, and that people have a responsibility to their Muses, there is no responsibility to go out of our way to disseminate damaging (i.e. damaging in the specific here/now of a sociohistorical location) texts.

An it harm none, do what thou will.

(To recognize "harm" as such, of course, we need a theoretical apparatus already in place--in this case, my radical feminist convictions.)

This is why, as I've said before in this journal, there is no such thing as a feminist text, and the flipside of the argument is that there is no such thing as a racist text: because texts don't speak with a moral voice. They don't speak with any voice at all; they need to be interpreted.
alixtii: Player from <i>Where on Earth Is Carmen Sandiego?</i> playing the game. (Default)
Okay, flist, what day is it? Because I remember going to bed and waking up--or at least I think I do (and I don't really know what the distinction is there, or if perhaps "I remember" is incorrigible--can I be mistaken about what I remember?--have I been reading too much Austin lately?)--only my computer says its ten p.m. instead of ten in the morning like I thought and that would explain why it's so dark outside and why they're setting fireworks off, and I'm just so confused.

Okay, maybe I was only asleep for fifteen minutes and thought I was asleep for the entire night? And didn't turn off my alarm half-asleep, like I thought, because it in fact didn't go off? I guess that makes sense, and means I didn't skip my morning walk. So hoorah, I guess.

I suppose that means I should go to bed now. But I don't exactly feel tired.

Wait. Did I feed the dog? Wait. Did I feed me? I don't remember eating dinner. I don't remember Friday evening at all.

*thinks*

Okay. Here's what I think happened: I think I took a nap after work, then woke up at 9pm thinking it was 9am Saturday when it was actually 9pm Friday. And when I was feeding the cats breakfast (I thought), I was actually giving them their dinner. That would explain it still being, you know, yesterday. And the fireworks are probably from a Riversharks game, because they have fireworks on Fridays. That makes sense. But I'm all disoriented now.

I'm going to go feed the dog now.

ETA: The other possibility is, of course, that I fell in a time loop and it is indeed my yesterday.

Which reminds me of my one other "sleeping time loop" story, which takes place in the beautiful town of Salzburg, Austria. My roommate and I (this was the semester abroad in London) had just flown in, and of course we changed our watches on the plane, setting them forward an hour. If either of us made a mistake and set it in the wrong direction, he would have set it back an hour.

We went to our hostel and, as we had been up all night (as our plane left Stanstead Airport at some ungodly hour in the morning and the transportation wouldn't be running yet, so we had to stay at the hospital overnight, keeping ourselves awake by doing our reading for classes), we immediately took a nap.

When we woke up, both of our watches were an hour ahead of everyone else's. That's two hours ahead of Greenwich Mean Time--a mistake either one of us would be unlikely to make when resetting our watches, yet alone both of us.

The only reasonable explanation, then, is of course that space aliens stopped time, experimented on us for an hour while we were sleeping, then returned us to the time from which they took us.

ETA2: Okay, I've fed the dog and fed myself. My grandmother's turkey soup, of which I still had some leftovers in the fridge, so yum. Isn't there supposed to be some chemical in turkey which makes one sleepy? Hopefully it'll help me get back to sleep, and when I wake up in the morning--the actual morning--everything will be straightened out.

See you on the flip side, flist.

Again.

Diagram

Jun. 9th, 2006 10:34 am
alixtii: The groupies from Dr. Horrible. (meta)
[livejournal.com profile] bookishwench asked, I can only assume facetiously, "Just how the heck would one diagram the first sentence in the Star Spangled Banner?"

This is is my best try:



I'm not quite sure what the what is doing. It seems to be taking the place of a that which, but I'm not sure how it is doing that, what that would be called, or how to diagram it. It's not ungrammatical--"I want what I deserve" strikes my ear as perfectly fine--but I don't know what it is.

I either love or hate the fact that I understand my native language so poorly. I'm not sure which.
alixtii: Player from <i>Where on Earth Is Carmen Sandiego?</i> playing the game. (Default)
This morning's Seven Days had me crying like a baby. Or perhaps more like me, when I am crying.

Anyway, [livejournal.com profile] bethbethbeth has a fascinating discussion going on over in her LJ. She's linked to this post in Neil Gaiman's blog on authors and morality. I know I'm not the only one who immediately thought of Orson Scott Card and his stances on, among other things, homosexuality and militancy. I know this because people who are not me mention him in the comments.

Most people seem to agree that the author's views shouldn't have an effect on the appreciation of the work, although a few point out that financially supporting someone who spouts hate by buying their book may be a morally questionable activity. But I think [livejournal.com profile] witchqueen is right in saying that she "think[s] Gaiman's questioner missed the really interesting question, which isn't, 'Do you enjoy the good work of people with questionable moral stance?' but, 'Do you enjoy high quality work espousing a morally deplorable view?'"

Having just finished an Ender's Game fanfic and having inhabited that world for a while, I can say that the novel is deeply problematic in so many ways. (Which doesn't change the fact that I love it deeply. Oh, Valentine.) The problem isn't just with Card, but with the novel itself. (Although admittedly understanding how Card thinks opens up elements of the novel that weren't obvious before; knowledge about the biographical author influences how we construct the author-function.) And the anti-abortion rhetoric in Shadow Puppets became so thick I felt like throwing up. Although there it was particularly disgusting because it was clear how he was warping and distorting his characters in order to preach his religious message.

But that's just the thing: we don't notice how problematic Ender's Game is at first because we read it with our moral perspective firmly in place. Card never comes out and says that what Colonel Graff does is good or bad, right or wrong; we're left free to judge for ourselves. Colonel Graff is just being Colonel Graff. Part of Bernard Shaw's genius is that he was never able to commit himself to the socialist message that he wanted to preach (and did preach in his prologues); his sense of drama and character always forced him to give the devil the best lines. As long as the author is true to their characters, it seems, texts don't really have moral voices, because they don't have morals. There's no clear right or wrong side, simply a sequence of events.

There is always the option of constructing an ironic or satiric author-function (regardless of the historical intent of the actual author) in our reading. I'm able to read Atlas Shrugged as a call for altruism and socialist healthcare. And anyone who thinks the Bible is unambiguously pro-Christian (or whatever relevant religion applies) simply hasn't read it. As [livejournal.com profile] shrewreader says on the second page of comments: "YMMV: It's not just for driving anymore!"

But still, there is the intuitive notion that these readings are against the grain, which implies that there is a grain. At least in this sociohistoric location, my intuition insists that there is something in the text which can strategically pass as an essence. (It's actual ontological nature isn't really the issue.) Spoiler for Ender's Game. ) Sure, we can read it as a satire and interpret these conclusions the same way we do spoiler for 1984 ) on the last page of Nineteen Eighty-Four, but is that really just as valid of a reading. And even if it is, the fact that we can doesn't disguise the fact that in most cases we don't and as a radical feminist I privilege praxis over theory.

I've often said that I don't think a literary work can be "feminist," in that concerns of character, narrative, etc. inevitably distract from that message and introduces thing which are problematizable from a radical feminist perspective. (But then again, what isn't problematizable from a radical feminist perspective?) But does that imply that a text can't be anti-feminist, either, because it is always potentially empowering to somebody? That texts can't be pro-militarism or pro-Nazi, anti-religion or anti-homosexual, that Triumph of the Will is just as much anti-fascist satire as it is pro-fascist propoganda? That the only that the moral message depends on is the moral commitments of the reader, and not any feature of the text itself? That was the conclusion to which I came in my thesis, but I'm still not completely comfortable with that radical a hermeneutic relativism.

After all, literary texts have the power to persuade and to convert, and it seems a castrated sort of text which could only provide that which one brings to it. (And yet I'm still reminded of Wittgenstein's statement that the Tractatus "will perhaps only be understood by those who have themselves already thought the thoughts which are expressed in it--or similar thoughts" and can't help wondering if maybe literature works the same way.) And I've already express my distaste with the "YMMV" doctrine when it is indicative of a radical relativism, because I don't think feminism is tenable under those conditions.

This is completely a theoretical question; I've already worked out the practical question ("Am I disempowering others, in this sociohistorical location, through my writing?") here. But still my intuitions are conflicting, which usually is a sign that something interesting is going on, theoretically.

So what do you think, flist? Can texts speak with moral voices? And if not, how do we respond to them when we see them disempowering people in a specific sociohistoric location?
alixtii: The groupies from Dr. Horrible. (meta)
How is it that I never knew that Jenny Grimaldi was in Serenity?
"You will notice that we now say chora and not, as convention has always required, the chora, or again, as we might have done for the sake of caution, the word, the concept, the significance or the value of 'chora.' This is for several reasons, most of which are no doubt already obvious. The definite article presupposes the existence of a thing, the existent chora to which, via a common name, it would be easy to refer."
--Jacques Derrida, "Chora" (trans. Ian McCloud)
The definite article presupposes the existence of a thing: Is there some new rule of French grammar of which I am unaware, or is Derrida just making stuff up? Because I know which option I find more likely. Sheesh. (And is the indefinate article okay? Am I still allowed to speak of "a chora" if I wish?)

Why is it that whenever theorists try to turn to grammar in order to make a point, they always end up saying something stupid? Mary Daly's "God the Verb" metaphor really should be "God the Gerund." Being an action or a process doesn't make something not a noun--as evidenced by the fact that both "action" and "process" are themselves nouns. Of course, Daly is only perpetuating R. Buckminster Fuller's lunacy. And a google search for "not a noun" shows this sort of idocy is alive and well, with claims (amongst genuine mistakes like Jon Stewart's claim that terror isn't a noun and actual cases where the noun-ness is in despute) that love, marriage, cheese, science, divorce, journalism, leadership, knowledge, nature, mind, and information are all not nouns, and I've only gone through a small fraction of the hits. I'm glad I knowlegde that now; I'll have to information it when I'm leadershipping (Bush/Cheny OTP?) and especially when I am marriaging.

A noun is a grammatical category. Taking an article is a grammatical characteristic. Neither signals anything important about the essential qualities of the signified on a metaphysical level, just how it is being used in a sentence.
alixtii: Player from <i>Where on Earth Is Carmen Sandiego?</i> playing the game. (Femslash)
There's an "On Terminology" section on yesterday's [livejournal.com profile] metafandom, and it has me suddenly wondering: when do we actually use the gen/het/slash distinction? When we meta, certainly, but many if not all of us recognize that the definitions are fluid and know enough to define our terms before we begin. (And when we do make assumptions--such as that femslash is or isn't a subset of slash--we often end up in vexed situations.)

I know I also use the distinctions when I'm organizing my fics, when I utilize a variety of categories, some of which overlap: gen, grön, femslash, het, friendship/pre-femslash, friendship/pre-het. (I haven't actually have written any m/m slash, although of course the conceptual category is there for me should I ever do so.) And sometimes figuring what counts as what is a pain in the neck, as the boundaries aren't exactly firm. But mostly the issue is my own private taxonomic nightmare and almost complete academic: I haven't recieved any complaints that a story which I marked "grön" should really have been "femslash" or vice-versa. (This may simply be a function of my not being a popular enough writer to attract that sort of wank, though.)

But the actual fics don't bear these labels anywhere on them: they simply have pairing and rating information. In my neck of woods, that seems to be a perfectly acceptable practice. So what's the issue, really?
alixtii: Drusilla holding a knife to Angel's throat. Text: "Got Freud?" (Freud)
Source Text: A text used by fans as a repositary for fictional facts about a fictional universe, such as the Buffy the Vampire Slayer series or J.K.R.'s website. In general, fen will decide for themselves which texts they consider authoritative, although they may look to authorial intent for guidance. Also, not all elements consists of content which cannot be transformed into propositional "facts" about the fictional universe, e.g. the soundtrack of an episode or the tone of a book. These are ignored in constructing canon, although they may be considered relevant in interpreting it (see below).

Canon: A. The total set of fictional facts about a fictional universe; B. The condition of being a member of that set of facts.

The problem is, in visual media, there's a very small amount of facts that are actually canon. Basically, we just know what people say, and a little bit about what they do (what's shown on screen). We don't know if they are telling the truth, and we don't know if things are going on as they seem. We haven't seen Xander and Anya actually having sex (and personally I don't want to), although we're led to believe they have sex a lot: we see them in a variety positions from which we are led to infer that they are having sex, or have just had sex, or are going to have sex. My favorite example happens to be the this debate over whether Giles goes to the bathroom. There's not enough canonical evidence to say for sure.

We really need a word for near-canon, those things--like the presence of Giles' reproductive system--that we would never think to question unless we were being perverse (and perversity is perfectly legitimate when writing fanfiction!). Giles could be a robot without the story being an AU, but the writer would still need to explain that choice where s/he wouldn't if s/he made Giles human, and this is despite the fact that both options are equally canon.

You see, when we think about our universes, we assume that the canon--a set of propositional facts--applies to a fictional universe, a "possible world" to use analytic philosophy language. We play "How many children had Lady Macbeth?" And in general, we imagine the closest possible world (in "logical space") to our own in which canon holds true, so we imagine Giles as a human and not a robot. The possible world closest to our own in which canon is true I call the least-hypothesis interpretation of canon, because it involves the minimum injection of weird stuff like Giles being a robot.

Sometimes when we are speaking (or typing) loosely, we treat uncontroversial facts about the least-hypothesis interpretation as if they were canon. Read more... )

Okay, in the subject I said I was going to defend ambiguity here, and I am. As [livejournal.com profile] wisdomeagle has pointed out before, there really aren't that many people who look at a text as if it were a set of facts about a fictional universe, basically narrowed down to fundamentalist religionists and fanfic writers. (And if Biblical literalists realized that the canonical facts of the Bible could refer to any number of possible worlds, and the closest one isn't necessarily the right--since presumably fundamentalists have a concept of "right" which isn't equivalent to a fan's notion of "best"--one, I wonder what they'd do.) I love Buffy as a playground in which to play, but also as an aesthetic object. Indeed, my aesthetic appreciation of it leads to my fannish love. And part of what I like about it is that it plays with ambiguity.

Ambiguity in a text admits of different interpretations, which enriches it. The fact that the text can sustain a reading in which Giles and Ethan were lovers as well as one where they aren't makes the text multi-faceted, interesting, more complex--for me, more beautiful. If Giles' relationship with Ethan is confirmed, if River is shown actively lusting after Simon, if Faith's last name is revealed (it's not canon until it is on screen, damn it!), then something is lost. Where we once had a hundred possibilities, a Schrödinger's cat, now there is only one. Now something is gained, too, and in many cases it is worth it (different people can argue over whether when something is worth it or not). Also, new ambiguities would be created. But I'm grateful for the ambiguities in canon, and I'm grateful that I don't know Book's past or the populatio of Londinium.

Read more... )
alixtii: Dawn Summers, w/ books and candles. Image from when Michelle hosted that ghost show. Text: "Dawn Summers / High Watcher. (Dawn)
This is me thinking "out loud" about my critical theory class, where we did de Saussure's Course in General Linguistics so you may want to skip this. Then again, I'm going to illustrate what I mean using the Jossverse, so you may not.

Linguistics with Dawn and River )

ETA: I just realized that on my walk down the hill after classes, I left my Norton Anthology of Theory and Criticism in the Persson men's bathroom. Luckily, I just drove back up to the upper campus and there was it where I left it, in the men's bathroom in the Social Sciences building (the PoliSci floor).
alixtii: Player from <i>Where on Earth Is Carmen Sandiego?</i> playing the game. (Default)
What is the relation between academia, acedmic concerns or interests, and fandom? I take up the issue at [livejournal.com profile] fanthropology.

Excerpt )

( Just follow the fake lj-cut. )

My flist is chiefly composed of acafen--both teachers and students--so I'd be very much interested in what you think on the issue. You can comment here rather than at [livejournal.com profile] fanthropology if you like.
alixtii: Player from <i>Where on Earth Is Carmen Sandiego?</i> playing the game. (Default)
In the second chapter of Through the Looking Glass and What Alice Found There, a young Alice Liddell accuses the Red Queen of speaking nonsense, and is supplied with the response: "You may call it `nonsense' if you like, but I've heard nonsense, compared with which that would be as sensible as a dictionary!"

It seems to me that fandom is a sort of Wonderland/Looking-glass land and the Red Queen's point is well-made. How often do we assume that the meaningfulness of our terms rest on our ability to define them?
Examples and meta )

Cross-posted to [livejournal.com profile] fanthropology here.

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