alixtii: An image from the webcomic Sinfest. A female devil chases after our hero, saying "Come here and get whipped like a man!" (BDSM)
In my profile, there is (and has been for years) at the very top, a quote from Roland Barthes about Parisian striptease: "Woman is desexualized at the very moment when she is stripped naked." It is given such a prominent place because I consider it in many ways to be my philosophy of ficwriting. I try to write in that same contradictory space in which Parisian striptease took place: presenting the female character for the reader’s desiring gaze without stripping them naked of their agency so that they become desexualized--for an object has no sex.

[personal profile] aris_tgd refers to "the dominant narrative of [. . .] fetish and [. . .] kink" as being the narrative "your bodies are thing which we are entitled to": having X as kink (in the original post, disability) means using X as an object of one's pleasure. This fantasy of entitlement exists in a similar contradiction: the woman's (or POC's or disabled person's or so on) agency undermines the entitlement by making access to their bodies their choice, while violent rape undermines it from the other direction (if one were truly entitled, force would not be necessarily). It is a truism that slash, of both the m/m and f/f varieties, is (among other things) a mechanism for exploring these types of power imbalances, often for the purposes of kink, without invoking the politics of heterosexuality.

Often, then, in fic as in society, the violence or implied threat of violence is shifted away, masked, sublimated. In the fics I cite in this post, my School of Lost Souls and [personal profile] wisdomeagle's Gather Paradise, this is the case. In my fic, Fred is entitled to River's body as part of a larger claim on River's body made by the Alliance, a claim whose logical endpoint we finally are shown in the movie Serenity and The R. Tam Sessions. In Ari's fic, the violence is similarly transferred to Wolfram & Hart, the demonic law firm which employs both Lilah Morgan and Fred Burkle, the two halves of the fic's pairing, at various points in the run of Angel. The characters in both fics do not have to resort to violence in order to assert their entitlement over the bodies of others, because all of the characters are already embedded in a system which systematically undermines their agency.

It is not coincidental that in both cases this nexus of power is aligned in opposition to the moral order of the canon universe; both the Alliance and Wolfram & Hart are the "bad guys." Both Ari's fic and my own thus become fics which not only depict sexual entitlement and enact a fantasy of sexual entitlement, they are also in some sense about sexual entitlement.

On the other hand, in my Narnia AU The iPhone of Queen Susuan the systemic nexus of power which affords the male protagoniost access to and control over his sister's body is aligned with the general moral order of the canon universe. Peter is entitled to Susan's body because their god has said so. Note that while I'm taking the dynamics to an extreme not seen in the canon text, I don't think I'm essentially changing them. Instead, I'm highlighting something that is already implicit in canon.

It would seem that imaginative resistance--the term philosophers of language use for the phenomenon wherein we find ourselves unwilling or even unable to imagine fictional worlds wherein the moral order is contrary to that which we believe holds in the actual world--would cause us to recognize Aslan as being evil in ordaining such an order, and Peter (and Lucy and Susan) as complicit for cooperating with it. (That would certainly be, say, Christopher Hitchens' analysis.) Insofar as this is the case, it seems that it should function as a satire.

And yet . . . it doesn't. It's not a fic about entitlement, simply a fic which depicts entitlement, enacts a fantasy of entitlement for the pleasure of the reader. It reads like an id fantasy of discipline and submission to discipline. There is, I think, a readerly construction of author's intent--the author-function--going on here: the reader intuits (and whether she is right or wrong is irrelevant so long as she follows the established conventions of her interpretative community) that the purpose of the fic is not to critique. This involves an examination of the plausible pscyhology of a community member: while it is not plausible to assume that Dean Swift really wanted to eat babies, it is much more plausible to assume that the idea of Peter spanking Susan might get an author hot. (Then again, maybe Jonny had a baby-eating kink. Who knows?) To say that a fic is "about" X is to say that we construct the author-function as havin depicted X for the precise purpose of making a statement about it; in "The iPhone of Queen Susan," this doesn't happen.

But as I've pointed out before, the real question is not whether the reader constructs the author as advocating (or at least not advocating against) a point of view. Insofar as this is what we are worried about as authors, we are shifting the focii of attention to ourselves and away from the suffering of the oppressed--we are more worried about looking sexist or racist or ablist than in acting sexist or racist or ablist. Instead, the question we must ask is: how is the story functioning within the community of its readership? Is it normalizing harmful behaviors, reinforcing damaging stereotypes, &c? The answers to these questions will rely as much on the character(s) of the readership(s) as on the content of the story. It is a matter of ethnography rather than literary criticism as such. The way Triumph of the Will or Birth of A Nation might function when shown to a contemporary sociology or history class is very different than how either film would have functioned in its original context, for example.

I've been accused in the past of being too trusting of fandom's ability to read fics critically in terms of sexual politics. It is a point well-taken: firstly, the generalizations I made about fandom's critical capacities two years ago aren't necessarily the same as I would make today; and secondly, obviously any of our understandings of "fandom" will be severely constrained, each of us having different and often strongly disparate experiences. Of course, neither is "fandom" synonymous with my readership, however. The question then becomes: how can I do my best to frame my stories in such a way trhat my own particular and unique readership receives them in the way which does the leat harm and the most good?

I think the advice that [personal profile] aris_tgd gives me in the comments to her post is probably the best solution:
I think that labeling these things as kink instead of as "how the world works" does help to change people's minds about the narrative. I mean, labeling "a man having sex with his wife even if she doesn't want to because that's what he's entitled to" as "spousal rape" instead of "how a marriage works" changes how we think about bodily autonomy and what marriage means. Labeling these as "constructed narratives for a particular kink" helps the reader realize that they are constructs.
ETA: It strikes me that it's probably important for me to point out that [personal profile] aris_tgd uses the term "label" instead of "warn" in the quote above. The distinction is important to me: what we're talking about is something an author uses to shape a reader's aesthetic experience, in the same we she uses the content of the story itself, not something which is imposed on the author regardless of what it may be she is trying to do. I'm thinking mainly in terms of AO3's tags, which a reader can also choose not to see if they don't want to be spoiled. (I have tags set not to display, for example.) I don't warn for story elements other than rape; I do, however, tag things in ways I consider to be accurate and appropriate, and I tend to be a maximalist rather than a minimalist in tagging (since even for someone who has tags set not to display, tags will still be a mechanism, via the sidebar, of finding new fic, so the more tags an author uses the more likely a reader will find her fic).
alixtii: Avril Lavigne, wearing glasses, from the liner notes of "Let Go." Text: "Geek." (geek)
The comments to Scalzi's post on OTW actually turned intelligent again (thank the Lord!) after that hetero/sexist detour I posted about previously, and have well and truly broken the 500-comment mark at this point. (I can count on one hand the number of times I've broken the 50-comment mark and have had my threads collapse.) But I've seen, here and there, references to a post about Heinlein where the comments were also nearing the 500-comment mark, and being the huge fan of Heinlein that I am, I went over to read. It's here.

I haven't read the comments yet, but the post itself is fantastic. I don't always agree with it;Scalzi seems (at best) ambivalent as to whether Heinlein was a sexist (and other things), and I can't really accept that, although I'll concede that trying to construct the author-function based solely on the published fiction is a more difficult prospect than it seems, because one quite quickly finds oneself coming up against a wall of unreliability: yes, a lot of his point-of-view characters sound alike (hardly a bad thing, IMHO, since the voice is so engaging) and it's tempting to assume they're all mouthpieces for Heinlein, but the fact of the matter is that Maureen Johnson and Lazarus Long hold differing positions (assuming one can trust them to be espousing the positions they actually believe in, which is always iffy with Lazarus) on any number of issues, and Heinlein undermines his narrators' reliability in other ways as well.

None of this means that Heinlein wasn't a sexist bastard. (I think other accusations, such as heterosexism and racism, are fair but more subtle-- he embraced his sexism wholeheartedly.) Just that texts don't speak with moral voices, as I might have mentioned before in this journal?

(If you have an hour, I'll give you my reading of Atlas Shrugged as advocating Rortian liberalism.)

Anyway, read Scalzi's post. It's intelligent and powerful--just like Heinlein at his best.

ETA: Note also that my favorite Heinlein books are the later ones--Time Enough for Love through To Sail Beyond the Sunset. I asked for Laz/Lor for [livejournal.com profile] yuletide. And I like the Starship Troopers film too--but then, you already know I'm not a purist.
alixtii: The feet of John Henry and Savannah, viewed under the table, Savannah's not reaching the ground.  (Dark Champions)
I'm glad we are having the authorial responsibility discussion (cf. [livejournal.com profile] metafandom), because "Isn't it contradictory to talk about a safe space for yourself, and then go on to render feminist criticisms of media (e.g., the Mary Jane statuette)?" is a not-stupid question that deserves to be mulled over and answered. Which is not to say that it is contradictory, because I don't believe it is, but being ignorant of the way that a contradiction could be seen to exist leaves our feminist arguments for what we are doing open to an objection that we could otherwise address.

I think that, in the large, the people who are "for" authorial responsibility (and I think that some of them really see everyone who disagree with them as against responsibility, rather than simply disagreeing on what that responsibility entails, using the same pseudologic that leads pro-lifers to assume that all pro-choicers love abortion and want to have as many as possible) are ignoring the differing effects that context can have on what authorial responsibility requires. Which is ironic, because their argument is really all about context.

No, I do not believe that works are written or read in a vacuum. Indeed, according to the flavor of literary theory to which I subscribe, in a vacuum the very act of reading would be impossible. But I don't support the writing of incest (for example) because I don't think that fictional texts have consequences. I support the writing of incest fanfiction because I am cognizant of the specific context within which these works exist and are meant to be read.

I mean, I believe that fictional texts have real-world consequences. I believe that fictional texts should be critiqued and judged by consequences they can reasonably be expected to have (Heinlein did not expect Manson, nor should he have). Radical feminist, here. It's pretty much a corner stone of my world-view; I believe it at least as deeply as I believe anything else. I believe that much of mainstream media supports a mainstream patriuarchal ideology and should be called on the fact. These are pretty much tenets of faith for me.

But I believe fandom, even (or especially?) its incest fics, resists that ideology on several levels. (While possibly being co-opted by it on other levels. I'm a radical feminist, I can problematize anything, including the problematizations. But sometimes we have to go for the surface good and leave deeper systemic issues for later. Women's suffrage is more important than gender-neutral language or nonsegregated bathrooms, although they're all necessary.) That incest fic? It's on the side of the angels.

The consequences of a HP fanfiction, written within the community of women for the community of women, are different than the consequences of having Lucius shagging Draco in a Warners Brothers blockbuster. Which is not to say that I'd automatically condemn having Lucius shag Draco in the WB movie, or automatically condone the fanfic. But the rubrics I used would be pretty radically different in how they were calibrated.

For one thing, (online LJ media fanfiction) fandom is a community in which a community of readers is also a community of writers (and vice versa), a fact I have yet to have seen mentioned but which I think is deeply significant. Our defining feature is that we are not passive consumers of texts. We are not going to be affected by a fictional text in the same way as Joe Average. We recognize the possibiliy of ambiguity of meaning and unreliable narrators, and God knows we know how to read "against the grain" (a grain which is itself, to my mind, socially constructed) to give a text the meaning we want to give it.

I've said a lot of this before, actually ) I'm just not convinced that, using the hermeneutical conditions brought to bear by the fandom community onto texts produced by that community, that a text could be read to be in favor of certain things which the fandom community agrees is wrong, such as rape. (Obviously, not everyone in fandom uses the same hermeneutic conditions, but when we're assuaging the damage a text could do, we're talking about trends.) Which is not precisely analagous to the question of whether such texts could affect us negatively (i.e., make us more accepting of rape) without being read as explicitly pro-rape, I suppose. But when read under those conditions I have no reason to believe that those sorts of texts will produce such a negative effect, and none of the interlocutors have given me any reason to believe such.

When I criticize, say, the movie Underworld (which drives me crazy with the way feminity is presented within it) I am doing so recognizing that a) its audience is not fandom, and will not in general read it subversively, and b) its producers (who were men) do not have the feminist cred that fan authors get. Same would go for the Mary Jane statuette, or Powergirl's cleavage, or Supergirl's anorxia, or the way that Stephanie Brown gets remembered, or whatever. (I mean, I hang out in femslash fandom. There's a lot of objectification of women going on around here. It's not the same.) (And note that none of the things above are intrinsically problematic, since I don't believe texts speak with a moral voice of their own. I'm sure there are big-busted people and skinny people on Krypton. It's the pattern within its social context--particularly that these unrealistic specimens of womanhood are made by and for het males--which is troubling.)

Insofar as fandom's specific context has been recognized by these authorial responsibility interlocutors, it has mostly been to say that, no, fandom is not a unique special snowflake. Which, you know, is a strawman argument. For an example, take [livejournal.com profile] cofax7's (who is on my flist and whom I love) formulation of the following "unstated assumption":
2. That as a members of a mostly-female community we are entitled to privilege our desires over any other concern because we've been oppressed in the past with regards to our creativity and sexuality.
First off, I don't care in the least what happened in the past--the past is past. Fandom's identity as a community of women for women earns it special status not by virtue of the oppression women may have suffered in the past with regards to their creativity and sexuality but because of the oppression they continue to suffer to this day. I'll be a post-feminist in the post-patriarchy, dude.

That said, "we are entitled to privilege our desires over any other concern" is absurd. I won't say that no one has argued that, because I'm sure someone somewhere has, but I certainly don't think it is an "unstated assumption" monolithically behind the entirety (or even majority) of one of the sides in the debate. Saying one (I suddenly feel uncomfortable, as a het male, using the first-person plural in this context, because it isn't my, i.e. Alixtii O'Krul's, desire which should be privileged per se) is entitled to privilege one's desires over this specific concern does not mean that one feels that one is entitled to do so with regards to any possible concern. As I've said before, fandom's Get Out of Jail Free card only goes so far.

In particular, I trust fandom on racial issues about as far as I can throw it, although that's still more than I trust the mainstream media. The SGA wank aside, the most frequent meta discussion on race seems to be variants of "Why don't we talk about race more?" No one's saying "Why don't we talk about sex more?" (Okay, actually, they have. The mind boggles.) We talk about sex all the times, and as far as I'm concerned fandom's earned its cred as far as sexual politics go. Not so on race. It still has a long way before it earns its ghetto pass, so to speak.

Conclusion: Claiming fendom as a safe space for women's fantasies does not mean that one does not acknowledge that fiction has consequences. Also, you should totally go write for my Incest/Cross-Gen porn battle. Or sign up for the 'Cest-a-thon. Or, if that sort of thing squicks you, don't. Either way I'm good.
alixtii: Mesektet, aka the White Room Girl. Text: "Dark Champion." (Mesektet)
"femlash" : "slash" :: "microwave oven" : "oven"

*

Some people are having "the authorial responsibility discussion." Some people are having it intelligently, some foolishly, some civilized, some wankfully--such is the way of the world.

Long-time readers will remember me struggling with these very questions myself when I asked "Do texts speak with a moral voice?"

But the question can't be--or at least shouldn't be--about what is inherently objectionable. The issue is context. Who is reading? Who is being harmed? The last question requires a healthy dose of both theory--to understand how thoughts can lead to words can lead to deeds--and empiricism, to see how they are actually doing it. The same text in different contexts can serve radically different--often diametrically opposite--functions. Nineteen Eighty-Four, a novel by socialist Eric Blair, has been reappropriated by the neo-conservatives. Hell, the New Testament has been basically reappropriated by evangelicals and conservatives. WTF?

It's not what is being written, in and of itself, which is at issue; it's what is being written in the context of how, and by whom, it is being read. (And who's writing, both individually and as a community.) What may be perfectly fine in the feminist utopia may be problematic in the here-now, and vice versa.

What other texts--and by texts I include practices, customs, behaviors--does the text in question connect with or resist? Sexual deviants, good and bad, do not have a broad network of structures already in place in our culture to facilitate their predation; sexists, racists, and heterosexists do. (Where rapists fall could be arguable--but again, noncon in a mainstream comic book is not going to have the same sociological effect as in a fanfic. It's just not. The values of the interpretative community are different, the readers are different, it just has a completely different function, and any quick and easy comparison between the two is absurd.) A story about incest is not going to function in the same way as a story about racism.

(Which is not to say that I don't come down firmly on the side of laissez-faire when writing what we want, when representing our fantasies. We have to work out our issues within the iconography which we have at hand, at that means at times writing things which may be sexist, racist, or heterosexist. But writing what we want is not the same as refusing to be critical of them after we've written them--the response to problematic speech is never supression, and always more speech.)

If you don't believe that patriarchal structures and systemic sexism (racism, heterosexism, etc.) are embedded in our society, then I'm sure that we feminists come off looking like self-righteous, wanton hypocrites, wanting a ridiculous double standard.

But then you come off looking willfully blind, so I suppose we're even.
alixtii: Player from <i>Where on Earth Is Carmen Sandiego?</i> playing the game. (Default)
I've been thinking about the wank (you know the one) and it struck me as interesting the way in which in literary analysis intent is illegitimate, but in moral analysis it's much more important. Unless you're a consequentialist or a utilitarian or one of the handful of other positions which eschew intent in moral analysis, too, but we won't go there. In general, though, I think we are okay with people making mistakes (underestimating the cultural literacy of their audience, say) and not so much with people doing things that they know are wrong. Unless you're an error theorist, in which case everyone falls into the first case, but we won't go there either.

(The most damning facts about the accused parties in the recent cases is the way in which they are reported to have acted after producing the texts, the comments they made which interpretive conventions lead us to read as to having been made in their own voices and thus cause us to construct their intent in a certain way, as being having not made a good-faith effort. I say this without firsthand knowledge. A fact can be damning without being true.)

But then it occurred to me that when we perform moral analysis we perform the same sort of Foucauldian process in constructing intent as we do when reading a text. We don't have knowledge about the actual intent of a moral agent (even if they are ourselves!) anymore than we do of an author. Only instead of an "author-function," we'd get something along the lines of a "moral-agent-function." Which would be all well and good, but with ethics aren't we much more invested in finding out what really happened (i.e., with the moral-agent-function being equivalent with the moral agent) than we are with literary analysis. Which is (I think?) because literary analysis doesn't compel us to any action that's more significant than hitting the back button (or, at most, writing a review that can wreck a career) while moral judgments lead to categorical imperatives which can literally be a matter of life and death. (Murder or self-defense? A person's life hangs in the balance! Or, you know, flaming a plagiarizer.)

In the soi-disant "real world," while we can't circumvent the theoretical limits of intent (we can't subpoena a ding an sich) we can cut through some of the practical ones--and often do, especially in extreme cases. Also, the law has protections built into that assume that when "the real truth" is obscured from us (as it inevitably is) the defendent at least is given the benefit of the doubt. (Too often the protections are circumvented, but that's paranoia for another day. Note to self: why haven't you mailed that cheque to the ACLU?)

The result isn't necessarily any closer to the truth, but it assuages our fears. We get a truth that we can swallow. We don't need a truth that is Truth, just one that we can unite behind as a community . . . a shared reality, a shared lie, in which we all can believe.

[I think I need a tag for discussing intent issues. "Author-function"? "Authorial intent"? "Intentional fallacy"? I wish I could make polls.]
alixtii: The feet of John Henry and Savannah, viewed under the table, Savannah's not reaching the ground.  (Dark Champions)
[livejournal.com profile] deliriumdriver was discussing V for Vendetta (the movie version, not the comic) in a flocked post on her journal, and it had me thinking about my own reaction to the movie. No one (and by "no one" I mean "neither [livejournal.com profile] deliriumdriver nor I") denies that it's a powerful emotional experience while one is in the theatre, but there is a sense in which it sort of falls apart when one thinks about it afterwards. (As opposed to, say, Donnie Darko, which had me screaming at the screen all through the ostensibly science-fictional parts because they made NO SENSE WHATSOEVER.)

Politically I suspect I am sympathetic to the views of the filmmakers, and I don't have any problem in principle with a movie being intended to be used to promote a political agenda; the intentional fallacy almost ensures the result will be richer and broader than the filmmakers intended. Some of my favorite literary works, from Shaw's plays to Rand's novels, were intended to serve as polemics (but succeed as literature for me insofar as they are read as failing at those intended goals; Shaw was a horrible polemicist because he always gave the devil the best lines). After all, texts don't speak with moral voices, or rather with a unified moral voice, speaking differently to different people in different situations in different places and times (who speak, so to speak, different languages).

Although from an aesthetic viewpoint I suppose I prefer a little more ambiguity à la Shaw (although the movie did impose ambiguity at points, and I suppose asking for the ambiguity to be "resolved" would mean asking for the movie to no longer be ambiguous), but I don't know what political message the movie was trying to make--or, to avoid the intentional fallacy, I'm clueless how I should be constructing the author-function. I mean, texts don't speak with a moral voice in themselves, but the message to me in this socio-historical moment was . . . I'm not sure. I guess I walked away with a feeling that dystopian governments are bad. Which is all fine and good, but did I really need to be convinced of that? Does anyone?

The claim that there is a point at which a government's authority becomes illegitimate and the only solution is violent insurrection is one that I can respect (and which, at its extremes, I suppose I hold--as probably everyone who is not a pacifist does). But the movie doesn't seem to answer the question of at what point a government has usurped its own authority, so I don't quite see what the point of the exercise was. There are not-stupid arguments that we have already reached that point, as Bush (or at least, Bush's lawyers) seems to be of the opinion that under Article Four he has the right to do whatever he deems necessary without oversight which to me is an interpretation of the text which makes Roe v. Wade look downright conservative.

And on some levels I'm just an idealist: is it better to live in a flawed government (and how flawed is flawed?) or to die for an ideal one. I'm already on the record that I'd rather a person let the Earth be destroyed than compromise their ideals, and this seems to be a related sort of ethical dilemma. I'd rather let terrorists blow up America than let people's civil liberties be infringed upon*, because otherwise what we're left with isn't really America, the land of the free and the home of the brave. And practically speaking, I have to admit that this isn't a realistic perspective (hence the idealism).

*Anyway to rephrase this sentence so the preposition isn't at the end of the clause? It's one of those passive constructions I'm so interested in, like "who(m) was whispered to."

As far as I can tell, V for Vendetta just channels (from the viewpoint of the filmmakers [at least as I construct the author-function] righteous and legitmate) anger with Bush and the current administration to a strawman (which I suppose considering the tradition of Guy Fawkes' Day is somehow strangely appropriate) and if anything I think that hurts their (my?) cause, because I walked out of that that theatre complacent with my life (it was better than the fictional England!--even though on reflection I'm not 100% sure how so) rather than, say, formulating plans to blow up the White House (or, as a nice middle ground, ready to fill out a cheque to send to the ACLU). (Which reminds me I really should fill out a cheque to send to the ACLU. Why am I putting it off*?)

"Off" is acting as an adverb in this question, if I'm not mistaken. Or else "put it off" just counts as idiomatic.)

I think my initial response to V for Vendetta was that I was too close to the events to really judge, and I think that was a wise stance. I mean, Nineteen Eighty-Four--on which most of you know I did my honors thesis--is a pretty shallow book if one reads it as a diatribe against Communism (or the Catholic Church or the BBC), and my English teacher who said that Animal Farm isn't "really" about animals, but "really" about Russians, plain didn't understand symbolism. (Animal Farm is "really" about animals and figuratively about Russians--but it's also figuratively about a lot of other things since symbolism is never an A for B substitution the way metaphor is.) (And a simile is a type of metaphor, except insofar as it isn't really a type of figurative language since similes are literally true.) (Most of my teachers probably didn't understand symbolism, which signals to me either a) I don't understand symbolism, or b) our educational system--both public and private--is a mess.) Brave New World--well, one of the things I like about Brave New World is that I can't reduce it to a single line of thought; I have no clue against what Huxley thought he was complaining. He's a little like Shaw in that respect I suppose (and I suppose that Brave New World Revisited could be seen as the equivalent of one of Shaw's prologues).

So the conclusion, insofar as there is one, seems to be that I should stop searching for V for Vendetta's moral voice (because it doesn't have one) and enjoy it (or not enjoy it, whichever the case may be) solely as a work of art, one which asks questions but does not provide answers. This is, of course, the type of hermeneutical process I outlined in my honors thesis, suggested for use on the novel Nineteen Eighty-Four, based on part on this passage from Wittgenstein's Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus:
6.53 The correct method in philosophy would really be the following: to say nothing except what can be said, i.e. propositions of natural science—i.e. something that has nothing to do with philosophy—and then, whenever someone else wanted to say something metaphysical, to demonstrate to him [sic] that he [sic] had failed to give a meaning to certain signs in his [sic] propositions. Although it would not be satisfying to the other person—he [sic] would not have the feeling that we were teaching him [sic] philosophy—this method would be the only strictly correct one.
And because it seems an appropriate way to end this post, and because it's just that awesome, and because some of you might not be aware of it: Philosophy Songs, a site full of philosophical song parodies including "Antinomy" (to the tune of "Chim Chim Cheree"), "Solipsism is Painless," "Hume on the Brain," and (my favorite) "Supererogationisticextraobligation"!
alixtii: Player from <i>Where on Earth Is Carmen Sandiego?</i> playing the game. (Default)
International Blog Against Racism Week is coming to a close. I like to think that every week is International Blog Against Sexism week in my journal, but race doesn't get mentioned all that often. I can't post with any particularly appropriate icons, for all the eight people who appear in my six icons are all white. While I think we are agreed that's deeply problematic, it is not as if going and getting an icon of a character I don't really like would solve anything. The issue is deeper, systemic, and blaming the individual never solves anything. (Not that I should be absolved of responsibility, either.) Changing my icons won't change anything; changing whatever made me not as interested in the non-white characters will, alongside an honest attempt to understand and appreciate the characters I might not "get."

(Honestly, this is how I see affirmative action most of the time. I don't oppose it anymore, because I think the restrictions on it by the Supreme Court are extremely fair, but I don't see it working particularly well, either.)

The closest character to a character of color whom I really loved is Kennedy, and she (and/or Iyari?) passed for white to me for the entire time I watched the show. I even sort of remember the "Really? Hmm" moment when I learned that Iyari Limon was Latina--and of course there are photo shoots of her that I've seen since which really accentuate it.(And there was a really great post about that and how problematic it is on my flist a couple days ago. Let me finish my thought and I'll hunt down the link.) Class issues intersect here--it was clearly established that Kennedy was at least upper-middle class, with a vacation house on Long Island, and there seems to be a weird (or not-so-weird, really, when one thinks about it) way that "upward" mobility requires a much greater enculturation in white culture (i.e., patriarchal hegemony) so that we would expect an upper-class Latina to pass for white better than a lower-class one.

Part of it is to whom I'm attracted; with the exception of the Mesektet/Dark Champions icon, all of my icons contain at least one character to whom I'm attracted. Why do I tend not to be attracted to people who are non-white (and when I do find such a person attractive, it is typically on "white" standards of beauty)? Well, "socialization" is the easy and obvious answer there, but I think the damage has been pretty much done by this point. Any suggestions as to how I can save future generations from this? (Of course, any evaluation of a person based on appearance is problematic from a feminist viewpoint, but it is not a practice from which we can very easily escape.)

Okay, so I wanted to use this time to revisit the question of whether texts can speak with moral voices, because that's part of what is at stake when we look at racism/sexism/classism in texts. There is nothing outside the text, so by definition every act of racism/sexism/classism is carried out via texts. And structural raceism/sexism/classism is built into the very language in which we create the texts, which presents those constructing the text with an interesting dilemma--we must work within the language so as to be communicative, but outside it so as to be liberatory. Twas brilig and the slithy toves did gyre and gimble in the wabe.

Sunnydale is a white, upper-middle-class community. Now there's some worldbuilding issues here, admittedly. We know that Sunnydale has people moving in and out a lot, and the property values are low, and I'm not an economics major so I don't know what it would take to keep up the upper-middle-class lifestyle that the residents of Sunnydale have. And it's been argued that geographically, there's no way a Californian suburb with that level of moving in and out could keep the level of racial homogeneity that it does. I don't know enough about California to speak to that issue. What I do know that here on the East Coast, there are plenty of towns just like Sunnydale.

To say that because Sunnydale is a white community that there is something oppressive with Buffy is ludicrous (and I'm not accusing anyone of making such an argument, just working through a train of thought.) Otherwise, only shows taking place in the Feminist Utopia would be proper, and I'm not sure that such a show would at all be entertaining. Instead, we must look at what function Sunnydale's whiteness performs. Insofar as Buffy is a subversive attack on the complacency of white middle class Americans, Sunnydale's whiteness is a suitably progressive source of satire. We know that the show called attention to the lack of diversity at least once, when Mr. Trick first entered Sunnydale.

If you're not convinced by this reading of Buffy I could go on, drawing on more details and whatnot. But as a result of various meta discussions, I'm not sure whether there is any correct reading. Buffy is a floating signifier, and as a result it says nothing and everything about race. A racist moving picture from the late 19th century might be the most powerful message against racism in the contemporary moment: it self-satirizes.

So what is a radical feminist to do, other than throw their hands up in despair? Nothing is forbidden, everything is permitted? Well, this is where the switch from theory to praxis comes in. (Although the way we conceptualize praxis--which is, of course, another type of text--is ultimately dependent on theory.) In this world, are people of color empowered or disempowered by the Buffy text? This is an empirical question that cannot be answered by watching Buffy alone, and as such, I have no idea what the answer is. And while I think censorship is always an evil, and that people have a responsibility to their Muses, there is no responsibility to go out of our way to disseminate damaging (i.e. damaging in the specific here/now of a sociohistorical location) texts.

An it harm none, do what thou will.

(To recognize "harm" as such, of course, we need a theoretical apparatus already in place--in this case, my radical feminist convictions.)

This is why, as I've said before in this journal, there is no such thing as a feminist text, and the flipside of the argument is that there is no such thing as a racist text: because texts don't speak with a moral voice. They don't speak with any voice at all; they need to be interpreted.
alixtii: Player from <i>Where on Earth Is Carmen Sandiego?</i> playing the game. (Default)
This morning's Seven Days had me crying like a baby. Or perhaps more like me, when I am crying.

Anyway, [livejournal.com profile] bethbethbeth has a fascinating discussion going on over in her LJ. She's linked to this post in Neil Gaiman's blog on authors and morality. I know I'm not the only one who immediately thought of Orson Scott Card and his stances on, among other things, homosexuality and militancy. I know this because people who are not me mention him in the comments.

Most people seem to agree that the author's views shouldn't have an effect on the appreciation of the work, although a few point out that financially supporting someone who spouts hate by buying their book may be a morally questionable activity. But I think [livejournal.com profile] witchqueen is right in saying that she "think[s] Gaiman's questioner missed the really interesting question, which isn't, 'Do you enjoy the good work of people with questionable moral stance?' but, 'Do you enjoy high quality work espousing a morally deplorable view?'"

Having just finished an Ender's Game fanfic and having inhabited that world for a while, I can say that the novel is deeply problematic in so many ways. (Which doesn't change the fact that I love it deeply. Oh, Valentine.) The problem isn't just with Card, but with the novel itself. (Although admittedly understanding how Card thinks opens up elements of the novel that weren't obvious before; knowledge about the biographical author influences how we construct the author-function.) And the anti-abortion rhetoric in Shadow Puppets became so thick I felt like throwing up. Although there it was particularly disgusting because it was clear how he was warping and distorting his characters in order to preach his religious message.

But that's just the thing: we don't notice how problematic Ender's Game is at first because we read it with our moral perspective firmly in place. Card never comes out and says that what Colonel Graff does is good or bad, right or wrong; we're left free to judge for ourselves. Colonel Graff is just being Colonel Graff. Part of Bernard Shaw's genius is that he was never able to commit himself to the socialist message that he wanted to preach (and did preach in his prologues); his sense of drama and character always forced him to give the devil the best lines. As long as the author is true to their characters, it seems, texts don't really have moral voices, because they don't have morals. There's no clear right or wrong side, simply a sequence of events.

There is always the option of constructing an ironic or satiric author-function (regardless of the historical intent of the actual author) in our reading. I'm able to read Atlas Shrugged as a call for altruism and socialist healthcare. And anyone who thinks the Bible is unambiguously pro-Christian (or whatever relevant religion applies) simply hasn't read it. As [livejournal.com profile] shrewreader says on the second page of comments: "YMMV: It's not just for driving anymore!"

But still, there is the intuitive notion that these readings are against the grain, which implies that there is a grain. At least in this sociohistoric location, my intuition insists that there is something in the text which can strategically pass as an essence. (It's actual ontological nature isn't really the issue.) Spoiler for Ender's Game. ) Sure, we can read it as a satire and interpret these conclusions the same way we do spoiler for 1984 ) on the last page of Nineteen Eighty-Four, but is that really just as valid of a reading. And even if it is, the fact that we can doesn't disguise the fact that in most cases we don't and as a radical feminist I privilege praxis over theory.

I've often said that I don't think a literary work can be "feminist," in that concerns of character, narrative, etc. inevitably distract from that message and introduces thing which are problematizable from a radical feminist perspective. (But then again, what isn't problematizable from a radical feminist perspective?) But does that imply that a text can't be anti-feminist, either, because it is always potentially empowering to somebody? That texts can't be pro-militarism or pro-Nazi, anti-religion or anti-homosexual, that Triumph of the Will is just as much anti-fascist satire as it is pro-fascist propoganda? That the only that the moral message depends on is the moral commitments of the reader, and not any feature of the text itself? That was the conclusion to which I came in my thesis, but I'm still not completely comfortable with that radical a hermeneutic relativism.

After all, literary texts have the power to persuade and to convert, and it seems a castrated sort of text which could only provide that which one brings to it. (And yet I'm still reminded of Wittgenstein's statement that the Tractatus "will perhaps only be understood by those who have themselves already thought the thoughts which are expressed in it--or similar thoughts" and can't help wondering if maybe literature works the same way.) And I've already express my distaste with the "YMMV" doctrine when it is indicative of a radical relativism, because I don't think feminism is tenable under those conditions.

This is completely a theoretical question; I've already worked out the practical question ("Am I disempowering others, in this sociohistorical location, through my writing?") here. But still my intuitions are conflicting, which usually is a sign that something interesting is going on, theoretically.

So what do you think, flist? Can texts speak with moral voices? And if not, how do we respond to them when we see them disempowering people in a specific sociohistoric location?
alixtii: Player from <i>Where on Earth Is Carmen Sandiego?</i> playing the game. (Default)
So [livejournal.com profile] nemo_gravis replied to my previous post with a thoughtful and intelligent post on the way that morality functions in fictional worlds the same way it does in the actual world. (Okay, that paraphrase is pretty heavy in my philosopher-speak, but that was the main thrust of Nemo's argument.) I agree with Nemo insofar as talk of the "attraction" we feel towards evil characters was opened up to allow for more than just sexual desire, but thinking about things there helped me to clarify my ideas here.

The voice of a fic is not the author's, but that does not mean the fic does not speak with a moral voice. This voice is instead rooted in the dialogue between the reader and the text, a dialogue over which the author has little control but which nonetheless exists. Furthermore, there are parameters within the sociolinguistic context which provide (predictable) boundaries for that dialogue; this is what separates "good" readings from "bad" ones. I find it difficult, as someone skilled (not by any fancy education, although I have that too, but simply by living in the culture and speaking the language) in various relevant narrative conventions, and even with imaginative resistance and assuming that the same moral rules apply in the fictional world as in this one, to interpret Buffy as not endorsing the actions of Buffy (even when she's clearly wrong, like late season 7) or Giles, or Battlestar Galactica as not endorsing the actions of Roslin. The narrative conventions make it clear who is in the right and who is in the wrong. Spoilers for BtVS S7 ) Furthermore, I can see people finding this message communicated via the aesthetic work persuasive--Alixtii being political some more )--even when a logical argument would not be able to accomplish this end. (Anyone remember the article "Also Sprach Faith" in Buffy the Vampire Slayer and Philosophy?)

So what? )

In addition to my feminist politics, I subscribe to feminist theologies, feminist metaphysics, feminist epistemologies, and so forth. I positively revel in what might be seen by intellectual conservatives as the oxymoronic nature of their backwards-seeming approach (putting political commitments before the search for "Truth"--whatever that is). But I hit a brick wall when I consider feminist aesthetics. Part of this is because, as I noted in my previous post, that when I put on my writer hat I become more of a Platonist/Moorean. Anyone who writes fiction so as to speak to the contingent aesthetic standards of a specific spatiotemporal location rather than enduring truths is, in my mind, at worst a propagandist and at best a hack. This is despite my philosophical conviction that said enduring truths don't actually exist--when engaged in aesthetic creation, we must believe in them. (I've nicknamed this phenomenon the "artist's antinomy"--which explains how a group as bright as the Bloomsbury authors could have fallen for Moore's quack metaphysics.) When I write, I have to write what I feel, not what I believe--even though what I feel is often deeply influenced by my socialization as a white het male in a patriarchal society.

(That aesthetics resists my radical feminism in this way implies to me that a retheorization of the way in which I concieve of the relations between these disciplines is necessary. Perhaps ethics and aesthetics are co-primitive? Still the quasi-foundationalism here is disturbing and in some senses deeply anti-feminist.)

But then, once I have produced a text, what am I to do with it? My own moral beliefs are irrelevant to an interpretation of the text; to take them into account would be to commit the intentional fallacy. But when I construct an author-function based solely on the fanfic, I find that his moral views are at places diametrically opposed to me; in "his" glorification of the will to power, "he" seems to be expressing the belief that it is acceptable to sacrifice freedom for liberty, that a betrayal of our principles is in some way justified when there are vampires at the gates. (But if vampires, then why not terrorists?) So, pursuant to the process of feminist criticism I described above, I speak out about the ways in which the texts perpetuate patriarchal modes of thought--the sort of feminist speaking out which I supppose I am doing now. But isn't there something vaguely hypocritical about denouncing the moral dynamics of a text which I have written? Am I hiding behind the intentional fallacy to ignore the fact that I am disseminating modes of thought which I find distasteful?

Does my commitment to my art trump even my feminist commitments? )

The best solution is pragmatic, I suppose. (Isn't it always?) A radical feminist like me can problematize anything. The question that needs to be asked isn't what would be the ideal text in the feminist utopia but what is empowering to these people at this time on the ground? (Turning to praxis is always a good idea when one has become bogged down by theory.) Empirical questions like these tend to bore me (I am much more the abstract theorist), but I share with much of fandom the conviction that fandom as a community of women writing is empowering to them (laugh of the Medusa, anyone?)--and perhaps the segment of fandom with which I am involved, in which women write about women is even more so. (In any case, I write for an audience which is more predominately queer, and thus ius more radically disempowered by our patriarchal society even compared to an audience of heterosexual women.)

I can't control who will read my fic (unless I flock it, as I have done in a couple of instances), but I can have a pretty good sense of the sociolinguistic parameters within which it will be interpreted by the community for which it is written, and I know none of you, flist, are going to decided that the president's actions are acceptable because Dawn treats herself as above the law when she sends Slayers to kill vampires. (Indeed, the very fact that I as a het male were am women as objects of desire in the way I do would be somewhat problematic were it not for the fact that I do it as a member of this community and for this audience.) But what if that weren't the case, and the interpretative lens which I knew would be brought to my fic might engender disseminating disempowering modes of thought?

Well, I suppose that is a moral dilemma for another day.
alixtii: Dawn Summers, w/ books and candles. Image from when Michelle hosted that ghost show. Text: "Dawn Summers / High Watcher. (Dawn)
Mark Liberman at [livejournal.com profile] languagelog has made a post discussing the use of the phrase "harm's way" in which he actually mentions the season 5 Angel episode. Also relating to linguistic issues, I've had a long discussion today [this part of the post was written a couple of days ago--ed.] with an international student who was visiting the appartment over our frustration with any and all attempts to parse sentences of the type
Who(m) was spoken to?
Yeah, I'm a geek.

[livejournal.com profile] ajhalluk has a post that was metafandommed on how literary characters aren't real people, and thus our moral obligations to respond to them aren't the same as they would be to real rapists, child molesters, etc. This links in to a flocked discussion [livejournal.com profile] cathexys has been hosting on ethical responsibilities in literature, especially in response to Holocaust depiction. It also connects to my flocked post in which I answer "Whom would I shag" with TMI and overthinkiness, the upshot being (for those I haven't friended) that treating fictional characters as real people (even just to question whether one would sleep with them) results in a lot of unforseen complications.

What I found most interesting about [livejournal.com profile] ajhalluk was the way in which her(?) post parallels the whole train of thought I've had recently over the concept of "monsters"--i.e. those characters who do evil in the service of good. "[H]eroes can get away with murder," she notes. "And frequently do." Jossverse canon is full of examples: BtVS Season 5 spoilers ) And I know that Battlestar Galactica isn't lacking in that category either; nor are Firefly and Serenity.

By writing about monsters--indeed by glorifying in their will to power--am I condoning their actions? Am I condoning that is acceptable to infringe on human freedoms in the name of security, in defiance of the one principle which I hold most dear? The answer to that strikes me as unequivocately no; none of these stories come with disclaimers saying "The behavior in this story is morally acceptable." They are fantasy and wish-fulfillment, not how I really want the world to be but how I sometimes like to pretend it is (or could be). But neither do they (nor should they) come with disclaimers saying "The views expressed by this fic are not necessarily those of the author." We should take responsibility for our creations.

Ethics and aesthetics interact in complex ways, a fact that was reinforced for me as I was doing my reasearch for my thesis. Our moral commitments determine how we approach a text; this is the entire problem (or pseudo-problem) of imaginative resistance. I literally cannot watch police procedurals, for they invariably contain scenes of police personnel cutting corners or not going to extremes to protect their suspects' civil liberties, and the invitation to imagine our world being like that provokes not only resistance in me but outright paranoia and hysterical fear. Monsters like Giles or Buffy are larger-than-life and thus safe; these creatures are far more urbane and thus in their way much more scary. (How do I know these things--which the texts seem to treat as perfectly fine--aren't being done on a regular basis? What could I possibly do to stop it, beyond renewing my ACLU registration?) Me being political )

As a critic and a writer, I am two minds of how my ethics should affect how I approach a text. My politics, metaphysics, and theology are all radically contingent upon my feminist ethics. It seems odd that aesthetics should be exempt, but grounding aesthetics in ethics just rubs me the wrong way in a way that grounding theology in ethics just doesn't--in analytic philosopher-speak, it contradicts my intuitions.

I guess the real problem is that when I am writing I become, in contradiction to everything I consciously believe, a Platonist or perhaps even a Moorean. I can feel aesthetic Good as if it existed outside of me; therefore it is free of all commitments, including moral ones. This is perhaps a necessary antinomy for the sake of artistic production; but once I have taken off my writer's hat and, as critic, approached what I have created, what is my responsibity to it?

* * *

I wanted to say more, but I graduate in a couple of days (note to self: return library books) and I have a dozen other things to do. [Thus the update window sitting open on my computer since Sunday morning--ed.] I actually have two ficathon stories due on the day I graduate, which shouldn't have been a problem since I've had this entire week off, but I just can't come up with a suitable plot for one of them. And the story is actually for one of y'all, and you deserve the best, flist.

October 2023

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